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ABSTRACT 
 
THE IMPACT OF THE KURDISH QUESTION ON TURKEY’S RELATIONS 
WITH ITS MIDDLE EASTERN NEIGHBORS  
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION BETWEEN 2002-2012 
 
 
Asil, Muhammet Ali 
   MA, Department of Modern Turkish Studies 
   Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Hasan Kösebalaban 
 
January 2013, 93 pages 
 
This dissertation analyzes the “Kurdish Question” from an International Relations 
perspective. Focusing on the impact of the Kurdish question on Turkey’s relations in the last 
decade with its Middle Eastern neighbors, i.e. Iran, Syria, and Iraq, and with the European 
Union; this study shows how Turkey-Middle East and Turkey-EU relations are shaped 
differently. In the search for reasons for this difference, Realist and Liberal IR theories are 
used. The main argument of this thesis is that Turkey’s relations with the EU and Middle East 
are different due to the different types of international systems employed in the corresponding 
areas. The international systems in the EU and Middle East are best explained by Liberalism 
and Realism respectively; and thus, Turkey’s relations concerning the Kurdish Question with 
the EU gains meaning through the lens of Liberal IR theory, whereas Turkey’s relations with 
its Middle Eastern neighbors becomes clear through the perspective of Realist IR theory.  
Keywords: Turkey, Kurdish Question, International Relations, European Union, Middle East, 
Realism, Liberalism 
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ÖZ 
 
KÜRT MESELESĠNĠN TÜRKĠYE’NĠN ORTA DOĞU KOMġULARI 
VE AVRUPA BĠRLĠĞĠ ĠLE OLAN ĠLĠġKĠLERĠNE ETKĠSĠ (2002-2012) 
 
 
Asil, Muhammet Ali  
   MA, Modern Türkiye ÇalıĢmaları Bölümü 
   Tez DanıĢmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Hasan Kösebalaban 
 
Ocak 2013, 93 sayfa 
 
Bu tez, Kürt sorununu Uluslararası ĠliĢkiler disiplini açısından analiz etmektedir. Türkiye’nin 
son on yılda Orta Doğu komĢuları (Ġran, Suriye ve Irak) ve Avrupa Birliği ile olan iliĢkileri 
üzerinde Kürt meselesinin etkisine odaklanan bu çalıĢma, Türkiye-Orta Doğu ve Türkiye-AB 
iliĢkilerinin nasıl farklı Ģekillendiğini göstermektedir. Bu farklılıkların sebepleri araĢtırılırken, 
Realist ve Liberal Uluslararası ĠliĢkiler teorileri kullanılmıĢtır. Tezin ana görüĢü olarak, 
Türkiye’nin Orta Doğu ve AB ile olan iliĢkilerinin farklılığının nedeninin, Orta Doğu ve 
AB’de farklı uluslararası sistemler bulunması olduğu öne sürülmüĢtür. AB’de ve Orta 
Doğu’da bulunan uluslararası sistemlerin en iyi Ģekilde sırasıyla Liberalizm ve Realizm ile 
açıklanabileceği; bu nedenle de, Kürt meselesi ele alındığında, Türkiye’nin AB ve Orta Doğu 
ile iliĢkilerinin yine Liberal ve Realist Uluslararası ĠliĢkiler teorileri kullanılarak anlam 
kazanacağı savunulmuĢtur.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Kürt Sorunu, Uluslararası ĠliĢkiler, Avrupa Birliği, Orta Doğu, 
Realizm, Liberalizm 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Kurdish question is one of the main problems of contemporary Turkey 
and is the subject of numerous academic studies. This thesis will approach the 
Kurdish question from the International Relations (IR) perspective. Focusing on the 
impact of the Kurdish question on Turkey‘s foreign affairs, the ultimate purpose of 
this thesis is to discuss how and why Turkey‘s relations with its Middle Eastern 
neighbors and the European Union are shaped differently.  
 Chapter I, titled ―Formulating the Research Question‖, provides the 
theoretical framework, the scope of the research, and the methodology. Two theories 
of IR are used in this study: Realism and Liberalism. They are offered as theories 
that explain, as far as the Kurdish question is concerned, Turkey‘s relations with its 
Middle Eastern neighbors, and the EU, respectively. In order to use the theories 
properly, this thesis uses two different units of analysis. One is the ―EU‖ as a 
multinational system, as an example for Liberalism; and the other is the ―nation-
state-oriented system‖ in the Middle East, as an example for Realism. From this 
perspective, this study takes a picture of Turkey‘s relations with two different types 
of international systems. The time period which the study focuses on is the last 
decade, in other words, the period of the AKP government. The data for analysis is 
collected through a systematic newspaper scan and examination of official 
documents.  
 Chapter II, titled ―The Impact of the Kurdish Question on Turkish-EU 
Relations‖, shows how the Kurdish question influences Turkey‘s relations with the 
EU and why Liberal IR theory provides an explanation for these relations. In this 
chapter, Turkish-EU relations are analyzed under four sections, each of which 
addresses a different aspect of the question. The first section is ―the retrial of 
Öcalan‖, which focuses on the ―human rights‖ and ―justice‖ aspects of the question. 
The second is ―closure of the Kurdish parties and banning Kurdish politicians‖, 
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which focuses on the ―political freedom‖ and ―freedom of expression‖ aspects of the 
question. The third section is ―the usage of Kurdish language‖, which focuses on the 
―cultural freedom‖ and ―freedom of language‖ aspects of the question. The fourth 
and last is ―debates around the law 5233‖, which focuses on the ―citizenship rights‖ 
and ―civic citizenship‖ aspects of the question. Through this analysis, the second 
chapter argues that Turkish-EU relations concerning the Kurdish question are shaped 
by Liberal behaviors and can be explained through Liberalism. 
 Chapter III is titled ―The Impact of the Kurdish Question on Turkey‘s 
Relations with its Middle Eastern Neighbors.‖ This chapter focuses on Turkey‘s 
relations with Iran, Syria, and Iraq. The reason for the selection of these countries is 
that they contain sizeable Kurdish populations. Hence, the Kurdish question becomes 
a crucial part of the relations among these countries. Providing a brief history of 
Turkey‘s relations with each of these states and the role of the Kurdish question in 
these relations, the third chapter argues that Turkey‘s conflicts as well as cooperation 
with its Middle Eastern neighbors, as far as the Kurdish question is concerned, are 
shaped around the principles of ―security of the state‖, ―territorial integrity‖, and 
―balance of power.‖ Since these principles are among its main features, Realism best 
explains Turkey‘s relationship with Iran, Syria, and Iraq, in particular reference to 
the Kurdish question. 
 In conclusion, this study sheds light on the last decade of Turkey‘s foreign 
affairs focusing on the Kurdish question. This dissertation also contributes to the 
literature in the sense that it takes a picture of Turkey‘s relations with two different 
international systems, comparing and contrasting Turkey‘s relations with the EU and 
Middle East, via focusing on the transnational Kurdish question and using two 
different IR theories, namely Liberalism and Realism. 
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Chapter I: Formulating the Research Question 
 
1. The Kurdish Question and Turkey‟s Foreign Affairs 
Numerous academic studies in the fields of sociology, anthropology, politics, 
and history focus on different aspects of the Kurdish ―question‖.1 Today, one can 
argue that Turkey is mentally far away from the days during which people denied the 
existence of Kurds and ridiculously argued that the word ―Kurd‖ comes from the 
sound of one‘s walking on snow.2 Those who claimed there was no such thing as the 
Kurdish question believed that terrorism could be stopped solely through armed 
fighting.
3
 The thirty-year war between the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and Partiya 
Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) which until today took more than 30,000 lives, has 
painfully taught the Turkish State one certain thing: there is such a thing called 
―Kurds‖, and they have certain problems in Turkey.  
                                                             
1 Among the most prominent works, one can see: Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds and the Future of 
Turkey, New York: St. Martin‘s Press, 1997; Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds in Turkey: A Political 
Dilemma, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1990; Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds Ascending: The 
Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; 
Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh, and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan, 
London, Atlantic Highlands, N.J: Zed Books, 1992; David McDowall, A Modern History of the 
Kurds: Third Edition, I. B. Tauris, 2004; Mesut Yeğen, Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu [The Kurdish 
question in State Discourse] Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim Yayınları, 2006; Mesut Yeğen, Müstakbel Türk‟ten 
Sözde Vatandaşa: Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler [From Future Turks to So-Called Citizens: The Republic 
and the Kurds] Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim Yayınları, 2006; Mesut Yeğen, Son Kürt İsyanı [Last Kurdish 
Insurrection] Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim Yayınları, 2011; Christopher Houston, Kurdistan: Crafting of National 
Selves, New York: Berg, 2008; Robert W. Olson, The Kurdish question and Turkish-Iranian 
Relations: From World War I to 1998, Costa Mesa, Calif: Mazda Publishers, 1998; Kemal KiriĢçi and 
Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict, 
London; Portland, Or: Frank Cass, 1997; Abbas Vali, Kurds and the State in Iran: The Making of 
Kurdish Identity, I.B. Tauris, 2011. 
2 Kenan Evren, who was the leader of the 1980 coup d‟état and the 7th president of Turkey, is claimed 
to be the one who came up with this idea. Actually, there is no proof that he publically announced 
this. However, Baskın Oran writes that in Evren‘s Hakkari speech, because the lieutenants he sent 
there before already talked about it, he did not find it necessary to mention that the word ―Kurd‖ does 
not imply a separate race; instead, it is a word which was related to the sound of people‘s walking on 
the snow in that region. Baskın Oran, Kenan Evren‟in Yazılmamış Anıları [Kenan Evren‘s Unwritten 
Memoirs], Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1989, p. 147. 
3 Here, I do not mean that these ideas are completely eradicated. Indeed they exist, yet they do not 
absolutely dominate the public opinion, state discourse and academia any more.  
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The problems experienced by the Kurds in Turkey have their roots in history. 
The modern Turkish Republic, established in 1923, aimed to base its existence on a 
unified ethnic nation. The Turkish nation, which lived within the borders drawn by 
the Lausanne Treaty, was now one nation – having one language, one flag, and 
simply one identity. Thus, in order to deal with the heterogeneity of the people living 
in Turkey, the governments applied assimilationist policies upon the ethnic groups 
other than Turks. The Kurds, the largest ethnic minority in Turkey, who showed their 
lack of acceptance of and resistance to these policies with different levels of intensity 
throughout the history of Turkey, are still concerned with getting their full rights for 
education in their native language, freedom of speech, unrestricted performance of 
cultural traits, and equal and just treatment as being the Kurdish citizens of the 
Republic of Turkey.
 4
  
The struggle of the Kurds and the governmental policies stemming from state 
ideology were interesting enough to attract academic attention. A number of 
academic studies were developed concerning the Kurdish issue. The Turkish State‘s 
method of treatment towards the Kurds, especially as coping with terror is 
concerned, is a problem in the relations between Turkey and the European Union, of 
which Turkey has been trying to become a member for decades. Meanwhile, the 
sensitive balance of power in the Middle East causes at times very tense relations 
between Turkey and its neighbors, namely Iran, Iraq, and Syria, due to the fact that 
they contain important populations of Kurds within their borders. In addition, two 
US-led wars against Iraq, one in 1991 and the other in 2003, also affected Turkey‘s 
relations with the United States as being its closest ally in the Middle East. This 
crucial position of the Kurds clearly makes them a subject of study from the 
perspective of International Relations.  
Kemal KiriĢçi, a prominent Turkish scholar, offers an evaluation of Turkey‘s 
position as being a country that has lands in both the European and Asian continents. 
Referring to the structure of the European Union, which proves to be successful in 
providing peace among its members and in establishing a supra-national body of 
                                                             
4 For enlightening analyses about the relations between the Turkish State and the Kurds, and former‘s 
approach to the latter, see Mesut Yeğen, Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu [The Kurdish question in 
State Discourse] Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim Yayınları, 2006; Mesut Yeğen, Müstakbel Türk‟ten Sözde 
Vatandaşa: Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler [From Future Turks to So-Called Citizens: The Republic and the 
Kurds] Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim Yayınları, 2006.  
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government to which every member nation state shows obedience, KiriĢçi sees 
Kantian Idealism as the main principle of the EU. On the other side, he observes 
Hobbesian Realism in the Middle East, mainly due to the sensitive balance of power 
and nonexistence of any multinational governmental system; and due to the relations 
among countries in the region that include threats, enforcement, and wars. Taking 
these into consideration, KiriĢçi views Turkey as a country between ―Kantian‖ and 
―Hobbesian‖ worlds.5  
Imagining Turkey as a country between Kantian and Hobbesian worlds invited 
me to look at the Kurdish question from this perspective. It appears that Turkey‘s 
relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors and the EU are shaped differently, which 
is also valid as one focuses on the Kurdish question. Turkey had serious problems 
with Iran, Iraq, and Syria, as far as Kurds are concerned. These three countries are 
the ones that have sizeable Kurdish minorities, thus Turkey has been very much 
alerted about the policies in these states concerning the Kurds. In the last decades, 
Turkey also frequently blamed its Middle Eastern neighbors for providing shelter for 
the PKK, which is listed as a terrorist group by the United States, the EU and Turkey, 
to provoke its Kurdish population and force the Turkish State to reconcile with the 
demands of these countries. Hence the Turkish State‘s understanding of the issue 
caused serious tensions between Turkey and its neighboring countries. This tension 
was reflected in the water crisis, for instance, as far as the relations with Syria is 
concerned, in the cross-border military operations considering the relations with Iraq, 
and in the diplomatic tensions in Turkish-Iranian relations.  
 
The European Union 
Turkey‘s relations with the EU, meanwhile, have also not  been free of 
problems with reference to the Kurdish issue. However, the content and nature of 
these difficulties are quite different from those existing between Turkey and its 
Middle Eastern neighbors. Turkey, as a country so far unsuccessfully trying to be a 
part of the European Union since the 1960s, has certain chronic problems that have 
been continuously addressed by the European Union to be solved immediately. 
                                                             
5 Kemal KiriĢçi, Between Europe and the Middle East: The Transformation of Turkish Policy, Middle 
East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2004, p. 40. 
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Turkey‘s lack of success in implementing a full democracy, completely abolishing 
torture, and respecting and protecting the rights of its citizens are among the 
problems that are also directly related to the treatment of the Turkish State towards 
its Kurdish citizens. The EU‘s pressure on Turkey was intensified after accepting 
Turkey as an official candidate state in 1999 to make amendments in the Turkish 
Constitution in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria. The expected changes were 
addressing the Kurds as the largest ethnic minority in Turkey – establishing one fifth 
of the population.
6
 The two different types of relations of Turkey, with its Middle 
Eastern neighbors and the EU, invites me to ask why these relations are shaped 
differently and search for the reasons behind them through focusing on the Kurdish 
question in Turkey.  
At first glance, it may be thought that this problem has a simple explanation. 
Due to its geography and demographic nature, Turkey has tense relationships with its 
Middle Eastern neighbors. Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbors have Kurdish 
populations on both sides of their borders. On the other side, the relations with the 
EU are far away from these geographic and demographic pressures, though it is still 
a reality that the Kurdish lobbies in Europe work hard for their people back in their 
motherlands. My intention here is not to deny that this approach offers an 
explanation to the situation. However, it is a fact that the mentality behind the 
relations of Turkey with both the EU and the Middle East remains understudied. So, 
by applying KiriĢçi‘s Hobbesian-Kantian-worlds-approach to the Kurdish question in 
Turkey, I develop a hypothesis that argues Turkey‘s relations with its Middle Eastern 
neighbors and the EU concerning the Kurdish question are highly influenced by the 
system, structure, and mentality in the Middle East and the EU. From this 
perspective, this study contributes to the literature as  it compares and contrasts 
Turkey‘s relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors and the EU through focusing on 
the Kurdish question and through using two different theories to explain these 
relations.  
                                                             
6 From the perspective of the Turkish State, it is problematic to call the Kurds an ethnic minority. The 
pressure on Turkey was about democracy and human rights, which ‗actually‘ addressed the Kurds as a 
minority; yet the Turkish State was ideologically not accepting any ethnic group as a minority 
referring to the Lausanne Treaty.  
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To make my argument clear, the liberal approach
7
 of the European Union as an 
international system approaches the Kurdish question from the perspectives of 
human rights, civic citizenship, cultural rights, freedom of language and expression, 
equal and just treatment, and abolishment of torture. Yet, on the Middle Eastern side, 
none of these titles seems to be a subject of concern; instead, the argumentations 
center around the issues of security of the state, territorial integrity, mutual respect to 
borders, continuation of the existing balance of power, and non-interference of each 
other‘s internal affairs.8 This proves the difference of mentality behind the relations 
of Turkey with these two worlds.   
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline has been a playground 
for two distinct theories, namely Realism and Liberalism. Although the ideas of both 
theories go back to classical thinkers  such as Kant, Grotius, and Machiavelli, it is 
argued that IR has become an academic discipline after the First World War.
9
 The 
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which is accepted to be the starting point of nation 
states as the main actors in inter-state relations, was in no sense affected by liberal 
thinking. WWI, however, started a period imbued with liberal thought, mainly due to 
the continuing impacts of the devastating war. The US president of the time, 
Woodrow Wilson, was one of the main figures behind this liberalism.
10
 Yet, the 
economic crisis of 1929, the emergence of extremist nationalisms in Europe and 
Japan, and the subsequent outbreak of World War II signaled the re-emergence of the 
realist approach in IR. The Cold War period, via establishing a bipolarized world and 
                                                             
7 KiriĢçi‘s ―Kantianism‖, which he uses to describe the EU, is a radical evaluation of liberalist 
understanding in the International Relations. Hence, from this point on I prefer to call the EU as a 
liberalist structure. For broader information about Kantianism, one can see A. Nuri Yurdusev, 
„Uluslararası İlişkiler‟ Öncesi [Before International Relations] in Atila Eralp et al., Devlet, Sistem ve 
Kimlik: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar [State, System and Identity: Fundamental 
Approaches in International Relations], Istanbul: ĠletiĢim Yayınları, 2007, pp. 51-53.  
8 The term ―internal affairs‖ is quite important as the Kurdish question is concerned. Each Kurdish-
populated state in the Middle East is very much suspicious of the other whether it is running policies 
to provoke the Kurds living in that country to create problems and threaten territorial integrity.   
9 Atila Eralp, Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplininin Oluşumu: İdealizm-Realizm Tartışması [The 
Formation of IR Discipline: Idealism-Realism Debate] in Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik, p. 59. 
10 Tim Dunne, Liberalism in John Baylis et al., The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction 
to International Relations, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 113; Atila Eralp, 
Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplininin Oluşumu, p. 63.  
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a relatively stable international system depending on power balance had been an 
appropriate arena for Realism to gain power. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1989 and the effects of globalism again brought certain powerful challenges to 
Realism in IR.  
 Realism and Liberalism should not be taken as unified and integrated bodies 
of theories. Throughout the 20
th
 century, severe challenges confronting each theory 
paved the way for new evaluations and as a result they have evolved into multiple 
streams. While realist thinking is grouped under three broad titles, namely classical, 
structural, and neo-classical realism; liberal IR theory has two versions called 
classical liberalism and neo-liberalism.
11
 However, one should note here that 
although the current point on which these two theories stand seems quite 
complicated, their main assumptions stand almost unchanged. The intention of this 
work is to provide these main assumptions and utilize them as the base for the 
present research.  
 The starting point here will be the Realist theory. The main assumptions of 
Realism can be stated as following
12
: 
 a) The sovereign nation-state is the main actor: Since the Treaty of 
Westphalia, the sovereign nation-states have been accepted as the main actors in the 
international arena. A supra-national governance system and a peace system are seen 
to be illusive. In realist understanding, a nation state cannot trust another one.  
 b) The security and survival of the state is the main purpose: The main 
purpose of the state is to provide for its survival and security. Hence, a state can take 
any measure to protect itself if it feels threatened by others.  
                                                             
11 Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, Realism; and Steven L. Lamy, Contemporary Mainstream 
Approaches: Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism in The Globalization of World Politics, pp. 92-105 and 
126-139. 
12 The following summary of the main ideas of Realism and Liberalism are assembled and organized 
from Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: 
Knopf, 1960; Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, Columbia 
University Press, 2001; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1979; Cynthia Weber, International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction, Routledge, 2010; Tim 
Dunne et al., International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, Oxford University Press, 
2010; Michael P. Sullivan, Theories of International Relations: Transition vs. Persistence, Palgrave, 
2001; John Baylis et al., The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International 
Relations, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008; and Atila Eralp et al., Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik: 
Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar [State, System and Identity: Fundamental Approaches in 
International Relations], Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim Yayınları, 2007.   
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 c) International system is characterized by anarchy: International system is 
an anarchical one, because there is no supra-national power, and the relations among 
states necessitate continual conflict. The states have to fight to secure their interests, 
which results in an unstable arena. Hence, eternal peace is not possible.  
d) States are rational actors: A state always follows its interests in every 
action. Realism believes that gains are relative, that is, one state‘s gain means the 
other‘s loss.  
 e) International politics is defined by power: The main feature that defines 
international politics is power. The more a state gains power, the more it will be able 
to assert its wishes. Hence, for every state to provide for its existence and security, 
the balance of power is the most crucial thing to be maintained. None of the states 
should be so powerful as to be able to undermine the other‘s authority. Power is 
generally understood to be military power.  
 f) The actions of the state are not defined by morality: States act according to 
political imperatives rather than moral ones. Yet this does not mean that the acts of 
the state are totally immoral; instead, a state has dual moral standards. It behaves 
differently towards its citizens and foreigners. To protect the community inside, it 
kills the ones outside. So, in a sense, the state accepts the former as a moral choice. 
 Now, let us move on to the main assumptions of Liberalism:  
 i) The main aim in international politics is the prevention of war and 
provision of peace: The consequences of the First World War created an intention to 
arrange international relations to prevent war and provide peace. To create a peaceful 
international arena was not an illusion.  
 ii) International law and institutions should be created: The first and most 
crucial step to provide for international peace is to create international law and 
institutions, and supra-national bodies to regulate the behaviors of states. These law 
and institutions are to serve the common benefits of the member states, and to create 
solutions to the problems among them.  
 iii) International relations should be shaped by moderation and compromise: 
Instead of enforcements or wars, states should seek solutions through moderation and 
10 
 
compromise. International institutions will provide help for this. States have to find 
reasonable solutions to their problems.  
 iv) An open diplomacy should be followed in international relations: In order 
to avoid mutual suspicions and perceptions of threat, states should follow open 
diplomacy rather than secret agendas and meetings.  
 v) Progress is likely in international relations: Having conflicts among the 
states does not mean that their issues are going to last forever. Conflicts can be 
solved and progress can be made in international relations. Hence, the international 
arena is not necessarily anarchical.  
 As to how to apply these two theories to my research, I argue that the 
European Union is an example for liberal IR theory through its international system 
(the Union), supra-national bodies (the Commission, the Council, the Parliament, the 
Court etc.), durable peace, ways of compromise (International Law), and open 
diplomacy (the Treaties). This liberal understanding of politics, which is also 
dependent on Kant‘s idealism, prioritizes democracy, republican governorship, 
human rights, freedom of expression, cultural freedom, tolerance  of differences, and 
civic citizenship.
13
 These traits of Liberalism can be easily read in the relations 
between Turkey and the EU. Chapter II shows how these liberal features gain 
prominence in EU-Turkey relations as far as the Kurdish question is concerned. My 
argument is that since the EU has a liberal structure, its approach to the Kurdish 
question occurs from a liberal perspective and its actions through liberal principles. 
                                                             
13 To provide universal (and eternal) peace, Kant offers a ―pacifistic union‖ (foedus pacificium) to be 
established. He counts six prerequisites for this establishment: 1) No peace treaty should save any 
reservation which may lead to another war in the future; 2) no country should be annexed by another 
one through heritage, exchange, purchase or charity; 3) professional and settled armies should be 
abolished gradually; 4) no debt agreement should be made which is related to the foreign affairs of the 
state; 5) no state should intervene to other‘s formation and governance through using force; and 6) a 
state which fights another one should not allow actions which would make mutual trust in peace time 
impossible. Kant also adds three decisive conditions for the foedus pacificium: 1) Every state should 
be governed by a republic and have a republican constitution; 2) International Law should depend on 
the federalism of free nations; and 3) the borders of the cosmopolitan law should be drawn by the 
principles of universal hospitality. According to Kant, a republican constitution has to base on three 
principles: a) the principle of freedom of all members of the society as human beings; b) the principle 
of subordination of every governed person to one and general legislation; and c) the principle of 
equality of everyone as citizens. This summary of Kantianism gives reason to believe that the 
structure of the EU has been highly influenced by Kant‘s understanding. See Immanuel Kant, Zum 
ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf [To Eternal Peace: A Philosophical Draft]. 
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In short, EU-Turkey relations concerning the Kurdish question gain meaning through 
the perspective of Liberalism.  
 On the other hand, my argumentation claims that the situation in the Middle 
East and the relations among the Middle Eastern states, specifically among Iran, Iraq, 
and Syria, are cases that are best explained through the lens of Realism. The lack of 
existence of an international system, a supra-national body, an international society; 
coupled with continuing tension, uncompromising relations, sensitive balance of 
power, frequently occurring diplomatic tensions and physical wars, threats, and 
enforcements lead us to conclude that Realism best explains the relations among 
these countries. This realist understanding of politics is reflected in the Middle East 
as non-democratic regimes – which call themselves ―republics‖ – and strong 
dictatorships which silence the opposition, undermine or totally block human rights 
and freedom of expression and culture, and apply torture through the hands of the 
state. The security of the state gains prominence in international relations operating 
at the expense of the society. From this point of view, as Chapter III shows, Turkey‘s 
relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors concerning the Kurdish question are very 
much shaped by realpolitik. Since there is a realist understanding of international 
relations in the Middle East, I argue that Turkey‘s relations with these neighbors, as 
far as the Kurdish issue is concerned, gains meaning through the lenses of Realist 
principles.  
 
3. The Scope of the Research 
 The time period of interest of this research is the period between November 
2002 and April 2012. This period coincides with the still ongoing period of the AKP 
(Justice and Development Party) government. There are several reasons for selecting 
this time frame. Firstly, the AKP period is a new period in Turkish politics in the 
sense that in the 2002 general elections, Turkish voters eliminated all the decades-old 
political parties and politicians from the political scene. This date signaled the 
beginning of a new era. Secondly, the AKP has been the first party to establish a 
12 
 
government on its own since 1991.
14
 After a decade of political instability, the 
coalition government period in Turkish politics ended, which meant that now there 
was a political party which held the support of an important part of the public and 
which had the power in the parliament to make decisions and apply them. Thirdly, 
this period has been a period during which Turkey came to the closest point of 
becoming an EU member since the first agreement between the two sides in 1963. 
Finally, Turkey started effective foreign policies to become a regional power during 
this period, especially after the appointment of the current Foreign Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu to the office in 2009.15 These four features of the last decade show that in 
order to develop a better understanding of the problem, this period should be studied 
from the perspective of the Kurdish question.  
 When I say ―the impact of the Kurdish question on Turkey‘s relations‖, I 
refer to a two-sided approach. On the one hand, the Kurdish question influences and 
changes the type of relations of Turkey with its Middle Eastern neighbors and the 
EU. On the other hand, the evolving relations of Turkey with the Middle East or EU 
change the direction in which this issue is heading in Turkey. These two processes 
may be very much related. To give an example, the closure of Kurdish parties and 
ban on Kurdish politicians strained the relations between Turkey and the EU, since 
the latter evaluates the situation as the former‘s blocking of democratic principles. 
This is one side of the relationship. On the other hand, to meet the freedom of 
expression criteria of the EU, Turkey released decade-long jailed Kurdish leaders 
and allowed them to reenter politics. If we look at the Middle Eastern side, the 
possibility of the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq 
worries Turkey in regard to its own Kurds. Meanwhile, Turkey launches military 
                                                             
14 Hasan Kösebalaban, Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization, Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2011, p. 147. 
15 Kösebalaban argues that foreign policy is a reflection of power that derives from identity. Hence, it 
is necessary to examine identity formations in Turkey to understand Turkish foreign policy. He 
outlines four major ideological perspectives in Turkish politics: Islamic Liberalism, Secularist 
Liberalism, Islamic Nationalism, and Secularist Nationalism. The AKP is a representative of Islamic 
Liberalism. Kösebalaban opines that Turkey‘s globalist and assertive foreign policy of the last decade 
is an outcome of Islamic-Liberal identity, which was very much reflected in the theorization and 
works of Davutoğlu, who was the chief foreign policy advisor to the government before he assumed 
the post. For this argument, see his Turkish Foreign Policy. For Ahmet Davutoğlu‘s assessment of 
Turkey‘s strategic situation in the region and its foreign policy, see Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik: 
Türkiye‟nin Uluslararası Konumu [Strategic Depth: Turkey‘s International Location], Küre Yayınları, 
2009. For an evaluation of his ideas and Turkish foreign policy during the AKP government, see 
Alexander Murinson, The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy, Middle Eastern 
Studies, Vol. 42, No. 6, November 2006, pp. 945-964. 
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operations in the very same area because it believes that the PKK members within its 
borders are organically related to that place. These examples can be seen throughout 
the research.  
 As to the unit of analysis, I introduce the European Union as a ―union‖ on the 
one side and the Middle Eastern countries as ―nation-states‖ on the other as two 
different units. There is reason for that. In order to understand how liberal principles 
work in Turkish-EU relations, one has to focus on the relations with the Union itself, 
because it is the Union that carries out these principles. The influence of Liberalism 
can be seen in the relations of Turkey as it addresses the Union. The relations with 
specific European countries can still be shaped by principles of Realism. For 
instance, Turkey‘s relations with the EU can be different from those with Greece in 
the sense that Greece can bring up certain nation-state problems such as the air space 
issue, and tension can be created between two countries.
 16
 However, Greece can still 
support Turkey‘s EU membership. Yet on the Middle Eastern side, due to the non-
existence of such an international system, the unit of analysis will be nation states. It 
is more logical to utilize Liberal and Realist IR theories through using these different 
units of analysis.   
 As this thesis focuses on the Kurdish question and its impact on 
Turkey‘s foreign affairs from an International Relations perspective, it leaves certain 
important aspects of the question out of its scope. One of these aspects is the 
economy. How Turkey‘s economic relations with other countries influence the 
Kurdish question, or what kind of an impact Turkey‘s domestic economic policies 
and those of other countries have on the Kurds constitute one aspect absent from this 
study. Another facet is more sociological: the impact of the social policies, state-
citizen relations, and social structures in Turkey and the other countries are also not 
considered in this study. A third aspect here is the geographic one: although the 
importance of geography in thinking about the Kurdish question is lightly touched 
upon, the impact of Kurdish geographical distribution and the demographic structure 
of the region vis à vis the Kurdish question is another piece this thesis leaves aside. 
The fourth characteristic in this sense is identity and policy making. This issue is 
mentioned in the conclusion in more detail. The identities and ideologies of policy 
                                                             
16 For a detailed history of Greece-Turkey relations in 1990s, see Baskın Oran (ed.), Turkish Foreign 
Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents, University of Utah Press, 2010, pp. 790-817. 
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makers in Turkey and other countries influencing the Kurdish question in the region 
are also not focused on in this study. Since this thesis concentrates on the 
international relations of Turkey with its Middle Eastern neighbors and the EU from 
an IR perspective, I have to admit the above mentioned central aspects for a more 
comprehensive analysis of the Kurdish question are missing. A broader emphasis 
instead is put on the nature and the content of Turkey‘s relations with two different 
international systems regarding the Kurdish question and how and why they are 
shaped differently.  
 
4. Methodology of the Research 
Throughout my research, I make use of primary and secondary literature. 
Primary literature is obtained through official documents and newspaper scanning. 
For official documents, I used the websites of two Turkish Ministries, namely the 
Foreign Ministry and the European Union Ministry of Turkey; and the official 
website of the EU. The newspaper content analysis was carried out through scanning 
the Hürriyet (Turkish) Daily News website, which is in English, and widely referred 
to in academic studies. The news about Turkish-EU relations was searched using the 
keywords ―Turkey‖, ―Kurds‖, and ―EU.‖ More than 1,400 news articles appeared, 
which were thoroughly scanned for this research. For Turkey-Middle East relations, 
another search was made using the keywords ―Turkey‖, ―Kurds‖, and ―Iran‖ or 
―Iraq‖ or ―Syria.‖ Approximately 3,000 news items in total appeared which were 
also scanned for this research. In addition, The New York Times, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, Radikal, and Zaman newspapers were made use of. The 
secondary literature was reached through library research. Academic works about the 
issue have been reviewed in order to establish an appropriate theoretical framework 
and to see which aspects of this issue have been studied in the academia. One can see 
the works reached in the references section. This section also includes the books and 
journal articles to which I do not directly refer to in this study. Yet I felt obliged to 
mention them because they provided me with a broader understanding of the issue. 
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Chapter II: The Impact of the Kurdish Question on Turkish-EU Relations 
 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I will show how Turkey‘s relations with the European Union 
are influenced by the Kurdish question in Turkey, and how liberal theory helps us 
explain these relations. To analyze the impact of the Kurdish question on Turkish-EU 
relations, I will focus on certain cases, including ―the retrial of Öcalan‖, ―closure of 
the Kurdish parties and banning Kurdish politicians‖, ―the usage of the Kurdish 
language‖, and ―the debates around the law 5233‖. Each case in this analysis focuses 
on a certain aspect of the Kurdish question in Turkey, and evaluates how the EU 
approaches the issue. The main intention is to show that the impact of the Kurdish 
question on Turkish-EU relations between 2002 and 2012 are shaped around the 
principles of ―human rights‖ and ―justice‖, ―political freedom‖ and ―freedom of 
expression‖, ―cultural freedom‖ and ―freedom of language‖, ―citizenship rights‖ and 
―civic citizenship‖ – which indicate that Liberalism is the most appropriate theory in 
explaining Turkish-EU relations. 
 
Turkish-EU Relations concerning the Kurdish Question 
 
1. The Retrial of Abdullah Öcalan 
 Abdullah Öcalan, who is widely known in Turkey as ―Apo‖, is the leader of 
the Kurdistan Workers‘ Party (PKK), which is listed as a terrorist group by the 
United States, the EU member states, and Turkey. Öcalan established the PKK in 
1978 with the aim of overthrowing the Turkish authority in certain Kurdish-majority 
cities in eastern and southeastern Turkey. The PKK decided to use violence to reach 
its target; and once the target was reached, it was going to establish a separate state 
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based on communist ideology. The PKK started its physical attacks against Turkey in 
1984. From the first day onwards, Turkey has seen this issue as a matter of separatist 
terrorism. Thus, it was the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) who became the leading 
actor in overcoming this problem. The war between the TSK and the PKK continued 
during the 1990s and named those years as ―bloody‖ in public. In 1999, Öcalan was 
abducted by the Turkish security forces in Kenya. The Turkish Court tried him and 
sentenced him to death for treason. However, under the harmonization laws that 
Turkey adopted in order to become an EU member, Turkey abolished the death 
penalty in 2002. Öcalan‘s punishment was subsequently converted to lifetime 
imprisonment on the Island of Ġmralı. After Öcalan‘s capture, the PKK announced a 
unilateral cease-fire and the fighting stopped. Yet it called off its cease-fire five years 
later. Today, the so-called ―low-intensified war‖ between the TSK and PKK still 
continues, which took almost 40,000 lives until today.  
 The situation of Öcalan is a sensitive one in Turkey. In the mainstream 
Turkish media, he is frequently referred to as a ―terrorist leader‖, ―head of 
separatists‖, or ―baby killer.‖ He is pictured as the greatest betrayer of the Turkish 
State, who is responsible from the deaths of thousands of people. Hence, things 
become quite complicated when any initiative is taken which seems to favor him. 
One has to keep this sensitive situation of Öcalan in mind to understand what the 
ECHR decision about Öcalan‘s retrial meant for Turkey.17 The first ruling of the 
European Court came in 2003, declaring that Öcalan did not receive a fair trial; and 
in May 2005, the Court‘s highest authority ―upheld this decision.‖18 The reason for 
this verdict was that ―Öcalan‘s ability to defend himself had been restricted‖ through 
preventing his lawyers from properly contacting him. In addition, the existence of a 
                                                             
17 Although the ECHR is not an EU institution, it is quite influential in EU-Turkey relations. The 
ECHR is a supra-national court based in Strasbourg. It was established by the European Convention 
of Human Rights and examines violation complaints about the contracting states. These contracting 
states are the ones that are included in the Council of Europe. These states number 47 for today, 
among which Turkey is also included. Although the ECHR is not an institution of the EU, its 
decisions are binding; they have to be applied by the members of the Council of Europe. The verdicts 
of the ECHR concerning the Council of Europe members also provide official feedback to the EU 
about the current situation of that country. Hence, the decisions of the ECHR, especially as far as the 
Kurdish question is concerned, constitute a crucial part in examining Turkish-EU relations. 
18 The New York Times, European Court Urges Turkey to Grant Kurdish Leader a New Trial, May 
13, 2005. Available at:  
http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F00B11FE3A540C708DDDAC0894DD404482 
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military judge in the court was also evaluated as a ―violation.‖19 After the decision of 
the ECHR, Öcalan demanded a retrial from Turkey. However, in May 2006, the 
Ankara 11
th
 Criminal Court rejected the application of Öcalan for his retrial and 
ruled that it was impossible to retry him under current laws.
20
    
 The decisions of the ECHR were not welcomed by Turkey. Although the 
government declared that it respected the court verdict due to its binding position, 
there were politicians who argued that the retrial of Öcalan would not make any 
change in his punishment. The then Foreign Minister YaĢar YakıĢ argued that ―even 
if he is retried, the same sentence will be given.‖21 The strictest political opposition 
to the verdict came from the ―idealists‖ of the MHP (Nationalist Action Party), who 
viewed the decision as Europe‘s anti-Turkish stance on human rights.22 The CHP 
(Republican People‘s Party) also showed its irritation about the verdict. Haluk Koç, a 
lawmaker from the CHP, blamed the government for being ―amateurish and inept 
while the decision was being finalized by the Court.‖ The then leader of the CHP, 
Deniz Baykal, implied that he saw the retrial of Öcalan as unacceptable.23 The 
military wing, as being the main actor in the Kurdish question, also did not remain 
silent. Then General HurĢit Tolon, who was the commander of the First Army, 
insisted that Öcalan‘s trial and punishment were fair. He also implied that ―the trial 
was conducted in line with our constitution and laws. The punishment against the 
terrorist leader has found its place in the conscience of the Turkish people.‖24 The 
fear of the Turkish bureaucracy and military was that a retrial decision may ignite 
unrest in the public due to the sensitivity of Öcalan‘s situation. However, this did not 
happen. The Turkish Court ignored the ECHR decision and rejected the appeal. 
 Although Öcalan‘s situation in Turkey is extremely sensitive and the 
approaches to him are very subjective and emotional, and although the PKK is 
recognized as a terrorist organization by the EU, the European Court could still look 
                                                             
19 Hürriyet Daily News, ECHR call for Ocalan retrial met grimly by Turkey, May 13, 2005. News 
articles belonging to Hürriyet Daily News are available at: www.hurriyetdailynews.com. Also see 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Europaeischer Gerichtshof: Öcalan-Prozess in der Türkei war 
unfair [European Court: Öcalan-Process in Turkey was unfair], May 12, 2005. Available at: 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/europaeischer-gerichtshof-oecalan-prozess-in-der-tuerkei-
war-unfair-1232764.html 
20 Hürriyet Daily News, Court rejects Öcalan‟s retrial, May 6, 2006. 
21 Hürriyet Daily News, Öcalan ruling sparks fresh dispute with Europe, March 13, 2003. 
22 Hürriyet Daily News, PKK leader Öcalan denied retrial, July 27, 2006.  
23 Hürriyet Daily News, Öcalan anxiety grips Ankara, May 12, 2005. 
24 Hürriyet Daily News, Öcalan anxiety grips Ankara, May 12, 2005. 
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at the situation of Öcalan from a human rights and justice perspective.  According to 
the EU, every person – though labeled as a serious criminal – has the right to be 
fairly judged.
25
 The European Court decided that Öcalan‘s trial was not fair 
regardless of who he was. This was an issue of human rights and justice in the eyes 
of the EU. However, since Turkey‘s approach is relatively subjective, it could not 
fully appreciate this objectivity. In the end, the Turkish Court rejected a retrial of 
Öcalan. However, this became an example of how the EU approached the Kurdish 
issue in Turkey from the perspective of ―human rights‖ and ―justice‖ in the case of 
the ―retrial of Öcalan.‖  
 
2. Closure of the Kurdish Parties and the Banning of Kurdish Politicians 
 Party closures and political bans are frequent occurrences in Turkish politics. 
In total twenty-six political parties have been closed by the Constitutional Court 
since 1950. There are various reasons for these closures and bans, and having an 
alleged relationship with the PKK is one reason which has been frequently used as an 
excuse to close Kurdish parties and ban its politicians in Turkey. However, 
implementing a pluralist democracy, which is seen as a necessity by the EU, requires 
all voices in the public to be represented in the Parliament.
26
 Hence, party closures 
due to ideological concerns are not acceptable in the eyes of the EU. In the EU‘s 
stance, this situation amounts to a limitation of ―political freedom‖ and ―freedom of 
expression.‖ 
 Historically, there has never been any obstacle for politicians of Kurdish 
origin to take part in Turkish politics.
27
 However, parties built on Kurdish ethnic 
                                                             
25 Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights on the right to a fair trial reads: ―In the 
determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded 
from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic 
society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or 
to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity 
would prejudice the interests of justice.‖ 
26
 In this sense, the 10% threshold used in the elections is also a major problem in Turkish democracy. 
This threshold is a serious obstacle in front of the pluralist representation in Turkey. Some even go so 
far to claim that this threshold is used to keep the Kurdish parties out of the Turkish Parliament.  
27 Yet they should not imply their Kurdishness and act with their ―Turkish citizen-identities.‖ As a 
famous example, ġerafettin Elçi was found guilty and imprisoned because he said ―I am a Kurd. And 
there are Kurds in Turkey.‖ 
19 
 
identity have always been regarded suspiciously by the Turkish State and almost all 
of them were eventually closed. Kurdish political parties have been seen by the 
Turkish State as the mouthpiece for the PKK in Turkish politics. Various Kurdish 
politicians‘ lack of will in condemning the PKK increased the level of suspicion, 
which created tension in Turkish politics. However, the closure of these parties and 
banning their politicians has never been appreciated by the EU. In contrast to the 
Turkish position, the Union does not assess the closures and bans from the 
perspective of terrorism. Instead, the EU evaluates them as restrictions on freedom of 
expression and political participation, which is the main tenet of Liberalism. 
 Closing Kurdish parties and banning their politicians are important aspects of 
the Kurdish question in Turkey. To show how this issue influences Turkish-EU 
relations and how the EU approaches to it, I will focus on three cases: the closure of 
the HADEP (People‘s Democracy Party), the retrial of Leyla Zana and her friends, 
and the closure of the DTP (Democratic Society Party).  
 
 The Closure of the HADEP 
The HADEP was one of the pro-Kurdish parties in Turkey. It was established 
in 1994 as the successor of another closed party, DEP (Democracy Party). It took 
part in the 1995 and 1999 general elections and won thirty-seven local municipalities 
in the 1999 local elections. In 2002, instead of HADEP, DEHAP (Democratic 
People‘s Party, another Kurdish party established in 1997) participated in the general 
elections via a decision of the Higher Election Board (YSK).
28
 This party received 
more than 6% of the votes and gained the majority of the votes in eastern and 
southeastern cities of Turkey. However, due to the electoral threshold of ten percent, 
it was unable to enter the Parliament.
29
  
 The decision to close HADEP came at a time when Turkish-EU relations 
were relatively tense. On March 11, 2003, the European Commission warned Turkey 
to find a solution to the Cyprus problem because Cyprus was going to be an EU 
                                                             
28 Hürriyet Daily News, The DEHAP closure syndrome, September 25, 2003.  
29 2002 elections was another example for the representation problem in Turkish democracy. That 
year, only two parties could reach the threshold, AKP and CHP. Yet they had 54% of the votes in 
total, which meant that 46% of the population did not have a say in Turkish politics.    
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member soon.
30
 Since the existence of Turkish control in Northern Cyprus was not 
internationally recognized, this warning implied that Turkey would be an occupier in 
EU lands if this issue was not immediately solved. This warning strained the 
relations. The day after, the European Court of Human Rights criticized Turkey in its 
decision that the jailed PKK leader Öcalan was not fairly judged. This declaration 
caused more tension.
31
 The Constitutional Court‘s decision to close HADEP with the 
conviction of having relationship with the PKK came right after these events, on the 
13
th
 of March.
32
  
 At a time when the EU was putting pressure on Turkey regarding the Cyprus 
issue and Öcalan‘s retrial was being discussed, the closure of HADEP came as a 
surprise that was expected to hinder Turkey‘s progress towards EU membership. The 
EU was expecting Turkey to grant broader rights to its Kurds and abolish obstacles 
in their freedom of expression. The decision of the Constitutional Court was 
evaluated by the EU as an attempt to politically silence the Kurds in Turkey. It was 
also a sign of the lack of implementation of the applied reforms. Hence, the EU 
organs harshly reacted to the closure of HADEP. European Commission spokesman 
Jean-Christophe Filori criticized Turkey by stating that ―this [decision] is an outcome 
which runs counter to the reform spirit which Turkey has been pursuing for some 
time now.‖33 He also added: ―We have certain doubts, at least in regard to the 
compatibility of this verdict with a certain view of pluralism which one would take to 
characterize a modern democracy.‖34 Joost Lagendijk, who is an MEP (Member of 
European Parliament) and the Co-Chairman of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary 
Committee, strongly criticized Turkey. He said that ―[t]he decision by the Turkish 
Constitutional Court to outlaw HADEP shows yet again that the suppression of 
political freedom continues in Turkey. Sadly, even the reform laws adopted 
previously in order to guarantee the activities of political parties have not changed 
much in reality.‖35 As it is clearly seen through the statements above, the European 
Union did not evaluate this issue as a fight against a terrorist group like Turkey did; 
                                                             
30 Hürriyet Daily News, In bitter exchange of fire with EU, Turkey bans pro-Kurdish party, March 16, 
2003. 
31
 Hürriyet Daily News, In bitter exchange of fire with EU, Turkey bans pro-Kurdish party, March 16, 
2003.  
32 Hürriyet Daily News, HADEP closed, DEHAP in row, March 14, 2003.  
33 Hürriyet Daily News, Closure of pro-Kurdish party draws international reaction, March 15, 2003. 
34 Hürriyet Daily News, Closure of pro-Kurdish party draws international reaction, March 15, 2003. 
35 Hürriyet Daily News, Closure of pro-Kurdish party draws international reaction, March 15, 2003. 
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instead, it blamed Turkey for restricting freedom of expression and political freedom. 
―Freedom of expression‖ and ―political freedom‖ are two main tenets of Liberalism, 
which explains the harsh criticisms of the EU in regard to closure. 
 
 The Retrial of Leyla Zana and Her Friends 
The situation of Leyla Zana is another example that shows that EU-Turkey 
relations are shaped by a liberal and democratic discourse influenced by the liberal 
understanding of the Union as far as the Kurdish question is concerned. The case of 
Zana provides further evidence for the EU‘s assessment of the situation from the 
point of political freedom and freedom of expression. Leyla Zana is an eminent 
personality in Turkish politics. She is a politician of Kurdish origin who was elected 
to the Parliament in 1991 from the city of Diyarbakır as a member of the SHP (Social 
Democrat Populist Party). During the swearing-in ceremony, she came up to the 
bench with a bandana of green, yellow and red colors, which are the colors of the 
PKK flag. After she completed her oath, she spoke one sentence in Kurdish.
36
 She 
received harsh reaction for her dress and talk, which contributed to the suspicious 
approach of the Turkish State to the use of the Kurdish language and any appearance 
of Kurdish identity. Three years later, after a speech they gave in the United States, 
Zana and her three colleagues, Hatip Dicle, Selim Sadak, and Orhan Doğan were 
sentenced to 15 years in prison for making PKK‘s propaganda.37  
 However, the EU again approached this issue differently than Turkey. This 
imprisonment was evaluated negatively by the EU, which saw this event as another 
restriction of freedom of expression. In May 2003, the European Court decided that 
Zana and her friends had not been fairly judged.
38
 Hence, it demanded a retrial. This 
time Turkey accepted this demand. This retrial was considered by the EU to be a trial 
of Turkey in regards to its level of freedom of expression. However, the Turkish 
Court gave them the same sentence it gave nine years ago.
39
 Although the symbolic 
retrial meant a lot for Turkey‘s progress, this verdict created disappointment in the 
                                                             
36 The sentence she said was: ―Ez vê sondê li ser navê gelê kurd û tirk dixwîm‖ (I give this oath for 
the brotherhood of Kurdish and Turkish peoples).  
37 Hürriyet Daily News, Court rejects releasing ex-MP‟s 11th time, February 21, 2004. 
38 Hürriyet Daily News, Court rejects releasing ex-MP‟s 11th time, February 21, 2004. 
39 Hürriyet Daily News, Court rejects releasing ex-MP‟s 11th time, February 21, 2004. 
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EU. Lagendijk argued that ―no one would believe Turkey was making progress if 
Leyla Zana‘s trial continued in this way and the defendants remained in prison.‖40 
Yet in 2004, Turkey abolished the DGMs (State Security Courts) that convicted Zana 
and her friends.
41
 Their case was directed to the civil court. On June 9, 2004, the 
court released these four politicians. This new verdict was evaluated as broadening 
freedom of expression and as a crucial step towards the EU. European Parliament 
President Pat Cox expressed that he was satisfied with the decision. European 
Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee President Elmor Brok praised the decision of 
the court and the abolishment of the DGMs in a written statement. EU Enlargement 
Commissioner Guenter Verheugen asserted that ―today‘s decision is a sign that the 
implementation of political reforms, which Turkey has been introducing in the past 
two years, is gaining ground.‖42 The head of the EU Commission Representation to 
Turkey, Hans Joerg Kretschmer, assessed the decision as a ―very positive move.‖43 
The decision to release Zana and her friends also received positive reactions from 
international human rights organizations. Amnesty International welcomed the 
decision and added that the release should be unconditional and Zana and her 
associates should not be retried. Human Rights Watch (HRW) even described this 
event as a new era in Turkey‘s human rights record.44 One month after the ―release‖ 
decision, the court lifted the political bans on Zana and her friends and allowed them 
to reenter politics.  
 The situation of Leyla Zana has been a significant part of the Kurdish 
question in Turkey. Her courage to assert her Kurdish ethnicity and to use her native 
                                                             
40 Hürriyet Daily News, Court rejects releasing ex-MP‟s 11th time, February 21, 2004. 
41 Burhanettin Duran argues that the AKP government ―used foreign policy as a tool to transform the 
domestic politics.‖ He mentions the abolishment of the DGMs as an example case. In this sense, the 
case of Leyla Zana supports Duran‘s argument as Turkey tried to soften political limitations on the 
Kurdish identity referring to the EU accession process and EU‘s pressures. See Ali Aslan‘s interview 
with Burhanettin Duran, Türk dış politikasında „medeniyet derinliği‟ arayışı var [There is a quest for 
‗civilization depth‘ in Turkish foreign policy] in AnlayıĢ Dergisi, October 2008. Available at: 
http://www.anlayis.net/makaleGoster.aspx?dergiid=65&makaleid=5375. Ali Resul Usul agrees with 
Duran on this. See Ali Resul Usul, Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri 2010 [Turkish-EUropean Union 
Relations 2010] in Burhanettin Duran, Kemal Ġnat and Mesut Özcan, Türk Dış Politikası Yıllığı 2010 
[Turkish Foreign Policy Almanac 2010], SETA Yayınları, 2011, p. 204. Ġlhan Uzgel also mentions 
that the EU was a tool used in Turkey‘s transition period. See his interview in Birgün Newspaper on 
December 18, 2011, available at: 
http://www.birgun.net/politics_index.php?news_code=1324211017&day=18&month=12&year=2011 
42 The New York Times, Turks Free 4 Kurds Whose Jailing Irked European Union, June 10, 2004. 
Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/10/world/turks-free-4-kurds-whose-jailing-irked-
european-union.html 
43 Hürriyet Daily News, Human Rights Watch: Turkey entering new era, June 11, 2004. 
44 Hürriyet Daily News, Human Rights Watch: Turkey entering new era, June 11, 2004. 
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language has made her an important personality. She raised her voice for more rights 
for Kurdish people. Hence, her conviction and imprisonment has been evaluated by 
the EU as a restriction of freedom of expression and political participation. Yet 
Turkey was punishing her for making PKK‘s propaganda. Regardless of what she 
said in her speeches, this shows a significant difference in Turkey‘s and the EU‘s 
approaches to the Kurdish issue. In Zana‘s case, the EU addressed the issue from a 
―freedom of expression‖ perspective and demanded a retrial, yet the re-conviction of 
Zana influenced Turkish-EU relations negatively. Subsequently, her release had a 
positive impact on the relations. From this perspective, Liberalism offers an 
explanation for why the EU pressured Turkey to release the politicians in Zana‘s 
case.  
 
 The Closure of the DTP 
The DTP‘s (Democratic Society Party) closure by the Constitutional Court 
was again evaluated by the EU as a restriction of ―freedom of expression‖ and 
―political freedom.‖   
 After the civil court lifted Zana and her friends‘ political bans, they returned 
to politics. Zana and Doğan started a new political movement. It was called the 
Democratic Society Movement (DTH). In August 2005, the DEHAP (the HADEP‘s 
successor) dissolved itself and joined Zana‘s movement to work for the good of the 
Kurdish people in Turkey.
45
 In November 2005, a new Kurdish party was established 
which named itself the Democratic Society Party (DTP).  
 The approaches of other political parties in the Parliament to the DTP were as 
suspicious as they were to its predecessors. Due to its ―guilty‖ past, its ―dangerous 
aspirations‖ such as helping the PKK and dividing the country were creating fear in 
Turkish bureaucracy and military. Hence, condemnation of the PKK by the DTP was 
seen as a prerequisite for the elimination of suspicions. Only then could the other 
parties develop ―normal political relations‖ with the DTP. However, the DTP did not 
do what other parties expected it to do. In the 2007 general elections, twenty-one 
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DTP members entered the Parliament as independent MPs (Member of Parliament), 
which was a number enough to establish a political group. With their entrance, the 
tension was carried to the Parliament. Prime Minister Erdoğan had been refusing for 
a long time to officially meet Ahmet Türk, the leader of the DTP, unless he clearly 
condemned the PKK.
46
 Instead of condemnation, DTP members made further 
statements that increased the suspicions. For instance, Veysi Dilekçi said: ―The PKK 
is a reality of this country, we have to accept that. We have an emotional relationship 
with it, not an organic one.‖47 Or, in an interview published on a German website, 
Emine Ayna declared: ―We do not support the PKK, yet we do not see it as a terrorist 
organization, either.‖48 These kinds of statements are perceived by the Turkish State 
as clear support for the PKK. Such ideas have never been known to survive Turkish 
politics. Actually, EU‘s pressure on Turkey to broaden freedom of expression was 
directly related to the permission of the State for these kinds of ideas. However, 
Turkey again failed this test. In December 2009, the Constitutional Court decided to 
close the DTP with the conviction of becoming a center for separatist actions.
49
 
 It was mentioned before that the EU listed the PKK as a terrorist organization 
and supported Turkey‘s fight against it. However, the EU strictly opposes the 
punishment of political, i.e. non-violent approaches to the issue. The DTP‘s closure 
was an example of that. As soon as the closure case was opened, the PACE 
(Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe) expressed concern about the 
judicial proceedings. A statement made by Lluís Maria de Puig, the president of the 
PACE, declared that ―the dissolution of political parties should be regarded as an 
exceptional measure, to be applied only in cases where the party concerned uses 
violence or threatens civil peace and the democratic, constitutional order of the 
country.‖50 After the closure decision was made public by the Constitutional Court, 
the EU expressed serious concerns over the decision, including a senior EU official 
                                                             
46 Hürriyet Daily News, Solution through more democracy, April 5, 2006. 
47 ―DTP‘li baĢkan: PKK ile duygusal bağımız var [A principle of the DTP: We have emotional 
relationship with the PKK].‖ Available at: http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=528527 
48 ―Staat würde die Kurden ―in die Berge treiben‖ [The State would push the Kurds to the 
mountains].‖ Available at: http://derstandard.at/3148408 
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 ―Anayasa Mahkemesi DTP‘yi oybirliğiyle kapattı [Constitutional Court voted unanimously to close 
down the DTP].‖ Available at: 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=968755&CategoryID=9
8. Also see: The New York Times, Turkey Bans Kurdish Party, December 11, 2009. Available at: 
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50 Hürriyet Daily News, PACE concerned about DTP closure case, October 6, 2008. 
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asserting that this closure might hinder the government‘s attempt to broaden the 
rights of the Kurds in Turkey.
51
 The reason for these criticisms was Turkey‘s shift 
from EU‘s liberal principles through blocking political freedoms. From this 
perspective, the closure of the DTP has been another sign of the EU‘s approach to 
the Kurdish issue from ―freedom of expression‖ and ―political freedom‖ aspects.  
 
3. The Usage of the Kurdish Language 
 The journey of the usage of the Kurdish language in Turkey is a good 
example to show how the Kurdish question in Turkey is influenced by its relations 
with the EU. Liberalism, which favors cultural freedom, explains the demands by the 
EU from Turkey to totally abolish the limits of the usage of the Kurdish language. In 
this part, the introduction of Kurdish-teaching courses and Kurdish-broadcasting 
television channels will be focused on to portray the progress of the use of the 
Kurdish language in Turkey, how it is affected by the demands of the EU, and how 
the EU approaches the Kurdish question from the perspective of ―cultural freedom‖ 
and ―freedom of language.‖ 
 Since its establishment, the Turkish Republic has been advocating an 
ideology that denies the existence of different ethnicities other than Turks. The term 
―minority‖ has been perceived by the State as religious minorities. Hence, Kurds in 
Turkey were seen as a part of Turkey‘s ―founder majority.‖ One can see that this idea 
prevailed in the State discourse until recently, and is still alive even today. To give an 
example, in a statement he made in 2007, the then President of Turkey, Ahmet 
Necdet Sezer, clearly mentioned that the Kurds were not a minority, instead a part of 
the majority.
52
 Another example can be given from a statement given by the 
predecessor of Sezer, Süleyman Demirel. He argued that EU‘s statements about the 
Kurds being a minority clearly showed that ―the Turks have been unsuccessful in 
                                                             
51 Hürriyet Daily News, Turkey edges further toward EU, December 20, 2009. In 2009, with the 
initiative of the government, a process called ―Democratic Opening‖ started. This initiative was also 
known as the Kurdish Opening. The attempt mentioned by the EU official addresses this opening. For 
a study including the AKP government‘s Kurdish policy, see the report ―Şark Meselesinden 
Demokratik Açılıma: Türkiye‟nin Kürt Sorunu Hafızası [From Eastern Question to Democratic 
Opening: Turkey‘s Kurdish question Memory]‖, prepared in 2011 by Hüseyin Yayman from the 
SETA Foundation.  
52 Hürriyet Daily News, Sezer calls Kurds a part of majority, January 11, 2007. 
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explaining the Kurdish question to Europe.‖53 He meant that Turkey was unable to 
make it clear that the Kurds were an intrinsic part of the majority in Turkey. This 
ideology of the State, which dates back to the establishment of the Republic, 
inevitably necessitated the rejection of Kurdish ethnicity. Since language is one of 
the most crucial constituents of an ethnic culture, the banning of the Kurdish 
language played an important role in this rejection, starting from the very first years 
of the Republic.  
 The rejection of Kurdish ethnicity and banning its language continued until 
nearly two decades ago. It was the early 1990s when politicians started to talk about 
the Kurdish reality. After a long period during which even everyday usage of the 
Kurdish language was prohibited, Turgut Özal was going to be the politician who 
lifted this ban in everyday life.
54
 With the EU‘s acceptance of Turkey as an official 
candidate in 1999, things have started to change. In 2002, to meet the Copenhagen 
Criteria, the Turkish Parliament approved a harmonization law
55
 that provided the 
Kurds with the freedom to learn their language.
56
 The law also allowed them to 
broadcast in Kurdish. From this date on, Kurdish courses and TV channels have been 
opened. These changes, as it will be discussed in detail, clearly show how the EU‘s 
approach to the Kurdish question, from the perspective of cultural rights, influences 
Turkey‘s attempts regarding this issue. Here, Liberal theory offers an explanation for 
why the Union puts pressure on Turkey to broaden the cultural rights of the Kurds in 
Turkey.  
 The process of opening Kurdish courses and television channels has not been 
free of problems. Although the reform packages, approved by the TBMM one by one 
in a short period of time, received EU‘s support, the Turkish government‘s lack of 
success in fully implementing these reforms attracted the Union‘s criticism. Indeed, 
                                                             
53 Hürriyet Daily News, Demirel: „We failed to explain the Kurdish problem‟, July 27, 2004. 
54 KiriĢçi and Winrow, The Kurdish question and Turkey, p. 135 
55 These reform packages created tension between the government and military, since the latter was 
thinking that the provision of the Kurds with broader cultural rights would increase the threat of 
separatism in Turkey. Here, it is possible to track the traces of Turkish military‘s traditional stance as 
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a Dilemma], ĠletiĢim Yayınları, 2002; Ümit Cizre, The Anatomy of the Turkish Military‟s Political 
Autonomy, Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 2, January 1997, pp. 151-166; William Hale, Turkish 
Politics and the Military, Routledge, 1994. 
56 Third harmonization law allowed education and broadcasts in local dialects, which opened the way 
for education and broadcasting in Kurdish language.  
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it was not logical to expect a state, which prohibited the usage of the Kurdish 
language for almost eighty years, to lift the bans and put the law in practice in just 
one day. In this sense, certain obstacles to Kurdish courses and broadcasts have been 
created by means of bureaucracy. The Kurdish language course in the city of Batman 
was an example case in this subject. After the law was put into force, a Kurdish 
course was decided to be opened in Batman in early 2003. This course was one of the 
first tests of Turkey‘s implementation of the reforms. Yet in October 2003, the 
manager of the course, Aydın Unesi, mentioned that it was unable to start teaching 
because the building failed to pass inspection. The inspectors claimed that the width 
of the doors were 5 centimeters narrower than they should be. The manager of the 
course argued that these kinds of obstacles were created by the Ministry to delay the 
opening of the course.
57
 In November 2003, having finished all of the physical 
requirements and paper work, the course was still waiting for approval from Ankara. 
As well as the manager, 200 registered students were waiting for the same 
approval.
58
 
 The European Union, which put pressure on Turkey to grant its Kurds 
broader cultural rights, was watching Turkey‘s steps closely. Hence, Turkey‘s lack of 
success in implementing the language reform found a place for itself in the European 
Commission‘s November 5 Progress Report for Turkey. Criticizing the attitude of 
the Turkish State, the report claimed that ―[n]o progress was made on the 
implementation of the August 2002 reform package on the learning of the different 
languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives. A 
number of applications to establish such language courses have been rejected by the 
authorities on the grounds that the curricula focus on culture and history and not on 
language teaching. Moreover, there are certain stringent regulatory requirements, 
which in practice prevent the classes from being established.‖59  The EU‘s concern 
on implementation of language reforms provides further evidence for its approach to 
the Kurdish question from the liberal perspective, which favors unlimited freedom of 
culture and language. 
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 Hürriyet Daily News, Official support extended to Kurdish language center, October 23, 2003. 
58 Hürriyet Daily News, Kurdish language courses on hold in Turkey despite EU reforms, November 
7, 2003.  
59 See 2003 Regular Report on Turkey‘s Progress towards Accession, p. 38. One can reach the report 
via following address:  
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/rr_tk_final_en.pdf 
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 Another problem-creating case in implementing the language reforms was the 
opening of Kurdish TV channels. The reforms necessitated the abolishment of limits 
over broadcasts in different languages. Turkey decided to start Kurdish broadcasting 
through the hands of the State instead of allowing private TV channels to operate. 
One important reason for this attitude was the State‘s distrust of Kurdish broadcasts 
in the sense that there was the continual possibility for them to broadcast in favor of 
the PKK.
60
 Hence, in the beginning, Turkey decided to reach this goal by itself. On 
June 9, 2004, the TRT (Radio and Television Institution of Turkey) aired its first 
Kurdish broadcast.
61
 This was the same day when Leyla Zana and her friends were 
released by the court. Thus, these two events happening at the same time received the 
EU‘s compliments.62 However, as in the case of the introduction of Kurdish language 
courses, local attempts to establish Kurdish television crashed the walls of 
bureaucracy.
63
 Local entrepreneurs who attempted to open local Kurdish TV 
channels had to wait until March 2006 to reach their aim. On March 9, 2006, the 
RTÜK (Supreme Board of Radio and Television) approved the broadcast of two 
local TV channels in Diyarbakır, namely Gün TV and Söz TV.64 Yet, they were not 
unrestricted in their airing time. There were forty-five minutes per day and four-
hours per week limits for the programs in local dialects. In addition, all TV programs 
in Kurdish required Turkish subtitles, which meant technical difficulties for the 
stations.
65
  
 These limitations over Kurdish broadcasting attracted the EU‘s criticism. In a 
tough speech against Turkey, Joost Lagendijk, who is an MEP and Turkish-EU Joint 
Parliament Committee Co-Chairman, criticized Turkey for the time limitations over 
the TV programs. Asserting that the EU was pushing Turkey towards full recognition 
of the cultural rights of the Kurds, he mentioned that it was not possible to 
understand why certain limitations in Kurdish broadcastings were needed.
66
 TV 
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 Hürriyet Daily News, TRT begins airing Kurdish broadcasts, June 10, 2004. 
62 Hürriyet Daily News, Human Rights Watch: Turkey entering new era, June 11, 2004.  
63 Hürriyet Daily News, Kurdish broadcasts to begin in January, December 29, 2005. 
64 Hürriyet Daily News, RTÜK approves Kurdish broadcasts, March 9, 2006. 
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stations also complained about this application. They said that they could not present 
forty-five minutes of news every day, and if they wanted to show a movie, then 
forty-five minutes fell short. After these complaints about the limits and the EU‘s 
criticism of the issue, the RTÜK decided to lift the limit for cultural shows. Yet it did 
not touch the limitations over the news and debate programs.
67
 
 With the initiative of the PM Erdoğan in 2008, the TRT opened a channel 
named TRT 6 which airs different programs in the Kurdish language 24 hours a day. 
However, it is not more than a cultural TV channel that is argued to be far away from 
fulfilling the needs of the Kurds for unrestricted performance of their cultural traits, 
including the use of their language. And the channel is still under state control. From 
this perspective, Turkey still seems to have a long way to go to meet the Copenhagen 
criteria. 
 The adventure of the Kurdish language courses and TV channels indicate that 
the EU approaches to the Kurdish question in Turkey from the point of cultural 
rights. Restriction over the Kurdish language was an important aspect of the Kurdish 
issue. Turkey took steps to overcome this problem under pressure from the EU. 
Turkey‘s steps were sometimes encouraged by the EU. Yet sometimes they faced 
harsh criticisms. This part of the chapter indicates that the EU was concerned with 
the cultural rights of the Kurds, a position that is better explained by Liberal theory. 
It was also a good example to show how the EU‘s liberal approach to the issue 
changed Turkey‘s attitudes towards the problem; and also how Turkish-EU relations 
were in turn influenced by Turkey‘s attitudes.  
 
4. The Debates around the Law 5233 
The Law for Compensating Damages Arising from Terror and War against 
Terror, shortly known as the Law 5233, is another case which deals with an 
important aspect of the Kurdish question in Turkey, and which shows that the EU 
approaches to the Kurdish question from the perspective of civic citizenship and 
citizenship rights, which are among the features of Liberalism. Thus, the EU 
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considers the compensation of the Kurdish citizens‘ losses during the 1990s that 
were caused by the Turkish State‘s strategy to fight terrorism.  
 When the PKK‘s attacks against Turkey started to accelerate, the Turkish 
State found a solution for controlling the terror in declaring an emergency state in 
certain eastern and southeastern cities of Turkey in 1987. It is not among the aims of 
this study to examine the effectiveness of the emergency rule in coping with terror, 
yet the saying ―bloody 90s‖ provides us with some clues. However, what is to our 
interest is that the emergency rule leaders, who were military staff, were granted an 
authority in their areas which was almost unchecked by any other power. The aim 
here was to allow them to be able to decide, act and respond to attacks quickly. Yet 
their authority caused serious undermining of human rights and citizenship rights in 
the region. For instance, the Kurds, who were accused of having relations with the 
PKK, faced serious physical and psychological torture in the prisons established by 
the emergency state. Another example in this case, which is the main issue of this 
part, was the decision to vacate certain villages and destroy them. The reason of this 
decision was the suspicion that these villages were used by the PKK as shelters and 
logistical bases. This decision was implemented by the army throughout the 1990s.  
 Emptying and destroying Kurdish villages resulted in serious problems. First, 
the living spaces of a huge number of people were taken from them. Second, since 
this measure was taken without any former social and economic preparations, it 
caused serious shortcomings for both the migrating people and the migrated areas. 
Third and most importantly, this process created a new category of people known as 
―forcibly displaced people‖ (FDP).68 The FDP were forced to leave their villages, 
their livestock and everything they had; and to establish a new life in a place that 
they had not seen before. Inevitably, this process has caused serious physical and 
emotional damage.
69
 
                                                             
68 These people are also referred to as ―internally displaced people‖ or IDP. Both usages seem to have 
political concerns. Since the case of these people includes the hands of the State, I prefer to use the 
term FDP rather than IDP to underline the measure taken and force used by the Turkish State.  
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Turkish courts. It also included some displacement stories. See The New York Times, Kurds Are 
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 The Law 5233 was approved in the TBMM in July 2004 and came into force 
in October 2004, to compensate for the FDP‘s physical damages and help them to 
return their homes. There were two apparent reasons for this new law. One of them 
was the complaint made by the FDP to the European Court of Human Rights. The 
ECHR found the Turkish State guilty in these cases which amounted to negative 
points for Turkey in its human rights record. The other reason was that the ECHR 
was sentencing Turkey to pay a huge amount of compensation money to the applying 
FDP. This attitude of the EU forced Turkey to come up with a law that would 
compensate FDP‘s damages and allow them to return their homes.70  
  Nearly half a year after the Law 5233 went into force, Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) released a report concerning the issue on March 8, 2005.
71
 This report 
examined the progress presented by Turkey to the EU in the implementation of the 
law. The report criticized Turkey on a number of issues. One criticism was in terms 
of the presented numbers of the displaced people and the returnees. According to the 
report, more than 3000 villages were destroyed and approximately 2 million people 
were displaced. However, Turkey claimed that this number was around 400,000.
72
 
The HRW did not find this number realistic. Another unrealistic number was that of 
the returnees: the report claimed that the figures presented by Turkey to the EU 
showing that nearly 125,000 Kurds returned to their homes were too high. The other 
point of criticism was in terms of application of the law. The HRW reported that 
Turkey had failed to ease the ways for the displaced Kurds to return. The State could 
not even provide electricity, telephone lines, and schools for the returnees.
73
 
 In addition to the HRW report, we receive further information from the 
statements of a Turkish NGO, Human Rights Association (ĠHD). The ĠHD was very 
much concerned with the progresses in the implementation of the Law 5233. 
Selahattin DemirtaĢ, the head of ĠHD‘s Diyarbakır office, stated that besides Turkish 
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government‘s inadequate and arbitrary support to the returnees, the village guards74 
had seized the farming lands and homes the Kurds had left behind.
75
  
However, amid the criticisms against Turkey‘s implementations, it appeared 
that certain positive events also occurred. According to Metin Çorabatır, who was the 
spokesman for the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) in 
Turkey, ―[the] recent reforms coupled with Turkey‘s EU candidacy is making a 
visible positive impact in decreasing the number of people who seek asylum in 
Europe while increasing the number who want to return to their villages from big 
cities in Turkey.‖76 In addition to this optimistic picture, Turkey also started a plan to 
speed up and facilitate the returns and accelerate the payment of compensation under 
pressure by the EU.
77
 Yet one should note that in total, these optimistic figures do not 
possess much place.  
 The convictions of the ECHR against the Turkish State considering the FDPs 
in Turkey provides evidence that the EU approaches to the Kurdish question from 
―civic citizenship‖ and ―citizenship rights‖ perspectives. The pressure coming from 
the EU and the ECHR forced Turkey to pass a law that organized the return of the 
displaced people to their homes and compensate their damages. Since these people 
are mostly Kurds, their displacement has become an intrinsic part of the Kurdish 
question in Turkey. Hence, EU‘s perception of the Kurdish question from the point 
of citizenship rights influenced Turkey‘s approach to the question in the same 
manner. In other words, the Law 5233 is another example that shows that Liberalism 
is a proper theory to explain EU-Turkey relations considering the Kurdish question.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I showed how Turkish-EU relations are affected by the 
Kurdish question in Turkey, how the EU approaches the question from a liberal 
perspective due to its liberal structure, and how Liberalism offers an explanation for 
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Turkish-EU relations as far as the Kurdish question is concerned. This chapter 
provided evidence for these arguments. Through the newspaper scan I conducted, I 
collected information about certain cases which were brought together under four 
titles, each focusing on a different aspect of the Kurdish question, to show that the 
EU approached the Kurdish question in Turkey from the perspectives of ―human 
rights‖ and ―justice‖, ―freedom of expression‖ and ―political freedom‖, ―cultural 
freedom‖ and ―freedom of language‖, and ―citizenship rights‖ and ―civic 
citizenship.‖ These cases were the retrial of Öcalan, bans over Kurdish parties and 
politicians, the usage of the Kurdish language, and the debates around the Law 5233. 
Through examining these cases, this chapter provided evidence for our starting 
hypothesis which claimed that Turkey‘s relations with the EU, as far as the Kurdish 
question is concerned, are influenced by the liberal structure of the EU and the 
debates around the question are shaped around the liberal principles of human rights, 
freedom of expression, culture and language, citizenship rights, political freedom, 
and justice. Hence, it can be argued that EU-Turkey relations can be understood 
through using the glasses of Liberalism.  
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Chapter III: The Impact of the Kurdish Question on Turkey’s Relations with its 
Middle Eastern Neighbors 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter analyzes Turkey‘s relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors 
via focusing on the Kurdish question. Three neighbors of Turkey were selected for 
this study, namely Iran, Syria, and Iraq, due to the fact that they contain large 
Kurdish populations within their borders. From this perspective, the Kurdish 
question plays a crucial role in Turkey‘s relations with these countries. By 
concentrating on certain cases, the ultimate aim of this chapter is to show that 
Turkey‘s relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors, in regards to the Kurdish 
question, are shaped around the principles of security, sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, and balance of power, which include enforcement, threat, interference in 
domestic affairs, and military intervention. As well as their disputes, cooperation 
among these countries is also shaped around the security of their states, territorial 
integrity, and balance of power. These features suggest that Realism is the most 
explanatory theory in explaining these relations.  
 
Part I: Turkish-Iranian Relations 
 
The Kurdish Question and Turkish-Iranian Relations since the late 1800s 
 Iran is a country that has been experiencing a Kurdish problem similar to 
Turkey. Following WWI, as the Russian and Ottoman Empires were dissolving, Iran 
managed to avoid this fate. Bayat argues that this was an outcome of a continuous 
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historical tradition of state and a sense of national identity existing in Iran.
78
 As soon 
as the world war came to an end, Iran‘s greatest concern appeared to be the 
suppression of armed local groups, Kurds being the most powerful among them. The 
repression of Simko Agha, who was a powerful Kurdish figure settled in Western 
Azerbaijan, happened in 1922.
79
 The next targets were the groups in Southern and 
Central Kurdistan. Iran managed to control these groups one by one. The Kurdish 
nationalist movements in these early decades of the 20
th
 century were not strong 
enough to challenge Iranian national identity. In addition, these insurrections 
remained mainly on a tribal base.
80
  
 In the meantime, Turkey was dealing with similar problems. In 1925, a major 
Kurdish uprising, the Sheikh Said rebellion, started in the city of Diyarbakır. The 
Turkish army suppressed this uprising heavy-handedly. In 1930, another insurrection 
occurred under the leadership of Ihsan Nouri Pasha, who was a military general of 
Iranian origin in the Ottoman army, in the mountainous Ağrı (Ararat) region. This 
uprising was a turning point in Turkish-Iranian relations. In the late 1920s, some 
Kurdish nationalists saw Iran as an ally against Arabs and Turks. There were two 
reasons for this: the similarity between the Kurdish and Persian languages and the 
pan-Iranist policies followed by Iran. Iran was under the assumption that it could 
bring together its different ethnic minorities under the umbrella of pan-Iranism. 
However, this assumption was seriously tested in the 1930 Ağrı rebellion in Turkey. 
During this rebellion, Turkey threatened Iran with bombing unless it stopped 
supporting the rebels. Realizing that bilateral relations with Turkey were approaching 
a dangerous point, Iran relinquished its support to the Kurds and allowed Turkey to 
pursue the rebels inside its borders in order to destroy them.
81
  
 Following the Ağrı Dağı (Ararat Mountain) rebellion, Iran and Turkey signed 
three important agreements. The Turko-Iran Frontier Treaty in 1932, with an addition 
in 1937, made adjustments in the Turkish-Iranian border to provide better control 
within the borders. The other two agreements, the Treaty of Conciliation, Judicial 
Settlement and Arbitration, and the Treaty of Friendship, both signed in 1932, aimed 
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to overcome similar Kurdish problems of both countries together. According to 
Olson, these three treaties ―constituted the new bases of Iran‘s relations with 
Turkey.‖82 Bayat opines that starting from the late 1880s Iran perceived the Kurdish 
uprisings and nationalist movements to be the ploys of external powers, especially 
those of Britain. This perception had two important results. One of them was that 
Iran ignored the grievances of Kurdish people within its boundaries. The other result 
was that it opted for agreements with external powers to solve this problem.
83
 It 
appears that Turkey also found this solution necessary for its territorial integrity. The 
three agreements between Iran and Turkey in 1932, which were going to establish 
the basis of Turkish-Iranian relations until the early 1990s, were a reflection of this 
mentality in both countries.  
 In 1937, another Kurdish rebellion broke out in Dersim, which was to be the 
last major Kurdish insurrection in Turkey until the emergence of the PKK. The 
Turkish army also managed to suppress this uprising. The role of the Turkish air 
forces was crucial in this suppression due to the heavy bombardment of Dersim. This 
would silence the Kurdish nationalist movement for approximately half a century. 
However, the Iranian experience was different. In 1941, Russian and British forces 
entered Iran to put an end to Reza Shah‘s rule. Local groups, including the Kurds, 
gained power with the weapons of the dissolved Iranian army. In 1946, another 
important event for the Kurdish movement took place. With the initiative of the 
Soviets, a Kurdish republic was established within the borders of Iran.
84
 The 
Republic of Mahabad, which was the first, the only, and the last independent Kurdish 
state, survived only one year. 
 The establishment of the Republic of Mahabad contributed to Kurdish ethnic 
identity and carried the Kurdish issue onto the international platform.
85
 Yet it did not 
cause any drastic change in Turkish-Iranian relations.
86 
It appears that until the 
Islamic revolution in 1979 in Iran, neither country provided support for the Kurds 
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within each other‘s borders. However, the power game between these two neighbors 
continued during this period. In the Kurdish region of Iraq, Turkey and Iran were 
competing to gain more power in the region through ―playing with and against the … 
KDP and PUK.‖ 87 
 The 1980s and 1990s witnessed significant developments considering the 
Kurdish question in both countries. During the Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988, 
in spite of pressure by the United States to take measures against Iran, Turkey 
remained neutral. Hence, the trade between the two countries was boosted. 
Meanwhile, Turkey was facing a new threat against its territorial integrity: the PKK 
started its attacks against the Turkish army in 1984. Amid these problems, a new 
dimension was added to the Kurdish question with Saddam Hussain‘s attacks against 
the Kurds in northern Iraq at the end of the decade. During the crackdown of the 
Kurdish uprising in 1991, hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees fleeing the 
wrath of Saddam, flooded the Turkish border. Besides failing to provide proper 
shelter for these refugees, Turkey was also suspicious that the PKK would make use 
of this turmoil to increase its attacks against Turkey. The humanitarian crisis in Iraq 
attracted international attention. To stop Saddam‘s attacks, the Operation Provide 
Comfort (OPC) was established in 1991. The mission of the OPC was to provide a 
no-fly zone in northern Iraq, protecting the Kurdish population from the possible 
attacks of Saddam.  
 In 1984, Turkey signed a hot pursuit agreement with Baghdad. This 
agreement allowed the Turkish Armed Forces to follow the PKK members into the 
borders of northern Iraq. When Turkey wanted to sign a similar agreement with Iran, 
Tehran rejected it.
88
 However, Ankara and Tehran made a security agreement in 
which both countries promised to prevent activities against each other. What was 
meant here were activities by the PKK in Iran and those by the Mujahedeen-i Khalk 
in Turkey.
89
  
 Although Iran refused to sign a hot pursuit treaty, Turkey‘s agreement with 
Iraq disturbed Iran during the 1990s. In 1992, 1995, and 1997 Turkey launched three 
major attacks into northern Iraq. Iran remained silent in 1992. Yet the other two 
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incursions faced strong criticism from Iran. Iran was uncomfortable with Turkey‘s 
cross-border operations since it was concerned that Turkey would increase its power 
in the oil producing regions of northern Iraq and even shift its southern border to 
seize the oil fields. However, it appears that Iran‘s fear of the Kurdish question was 
greater than its suspicions about Turkey. In 1993, Turkey, Iran, and Syria signed 
tripartite security agreements to prevent PKK activities in their borders. Although 
Iran criticized Turkey and stated that the 1995 incursion was a border violation, it 
still attended the following security meeting, declaring that Iran was against 
terrorism and the division of Iraq.
90
  
 The agreements between Iran and Turkey to overcome the Kurdish question 
were serving both countries‘ interests. Despite the fact that Turkey suspected that 
Iran covertly provided help for the PKK in Iraq, Iran, and Europe and even though 
Iran suspected that Turkey sheltered Mujahedeen-i Khalk in Iraq and Turkey, both 
countries continued a ―plausible deniability‖ considering this issue.91 Actually, there 
are a number of realpolitik reasons for Turkey-Iran cooperation against the Kurdish 
question in the Middle East. Firstly, if an independent Kurdish state existed in 
northern Iraq, it could stir the Kurds of both countries. Secondly, Iran feared that if it 
used the Kurdish card against Turkey, Turkey could use the Azeri card against Iran. 
Thirdly, geo-politic and geostrategic interests of both countries necessitated 
cooperation over the Kurdish question. Most importantly, the shares of oil and 
natural gas distribution required agreement. These reasons explain the cooperation of 
Iran and Turkey to keep the Kurds within their borders under control.  
 As one last word, it is important to note that although both countries followed 
realpolitik measures to keep their Kurds away from any possible unrest that could 
lead to segregation; they also carried out certain reforms for their Kurdish 
population. As it was the case in Turkey with its EU accession process, Iran also 
lifted certain limitations over its Kurds during the Khatami period. During this 
period, Kurds could make publications in their native language, which contributed to 
the Kurdish national identity in Iran.
92
 However, reforms in both countries do not 
influence the two countries‘ relations as much as the concern to maintain order does. 
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In the next section, I will deal with how these concerns were shaped in the last 
decade and how Realism appears to be the theory that best explains Turkish-Iranian 
relations considering the Kurdish question.  
 
The Kurdish Question and Turkish-Iranian Relations since 2002 
 This section analyzes Iran-Turkey relations in regards to the Kurdish question 
and tries to show how these relations are shaped by realpolitik concerns such as 
territorial integrity, security of the state, balance of power, and maintaining status 
quo. Thus Realism is the best theory which offers an explanation for these relations.  
 The relations between Turkey and Iran evolved into a different path in the last 
decade compared to the 1980s and 1990s. Those years were marked by tension and 
disagreement between the two countries, mainly due to Turkey‘s accusations that 
Iran supported radical Islamism in Turkey and the PKK in Iran and Iraq. However, 
the last decade witnessed a considerable improvement in the relations between the 
two. One very significant reason for this change was the US-led war in Iraq, which 
awakened realpolitik concerns of both Turkey and Iran.  
 The US-led war against the Saddam regime was different from the one in 
1991. At that time Turkey and Iran were not so much concerned about the US 
intervention. However, as mentioned above, after the 1991 war, a no-fly zone was 
established in northern Iraq, where the Kurds lived. This protected zone proved an 
opportunity for the Kurds to create a de facto autonomous region. Hence, when 
George W. Bush expressed his intention of overthrowing the Saddam regime, both 
Turkey and Iran raised serious concerns about the possibility of the establishment of 
an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. The concerns of these two countries 
were mainly based on three ―dangers‖: a) an independent Kurdish state would lead to 
unrest among the Kurdish populations within their borders; b) this unrest would lead 
to an escalation in terrorist attacks; and c) this would eventually lead to disintegration 
of the Kurds from Turkey and Iran, and to be subsequently integrated into a newly-
founded Kurdish state. These realpolitik concerns imply that Turkish-Iranian 
relations in the last decade were shaped around the principles of territorial integrity, 
security, and maintenance of balance of power and the status quo. Recall from the 
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first chapter that Realism argues that international arena is defined by power 
struggles and the nation states as the main actors try to keep the power balance to 
provide their security and territorial integrity. In this sense, the features of Turkish-
Iranian relations, as will be discussed in detail below, contribute to our thesis that 
Realism offers an explanation for these relations as far as the Kurdish question is 
concerned.  
The Kurdish Unrest in Iran and Turkey 
One of the greatest fears in the Middle East was the establishment of an 
independent Kurdish state, which would result in unrest among Kurdish populations 
in both Turkey and Iran to gain broader rights and even to separate. These concerns 
were made explicit from the very beginning of a possible US attack against Iraq to 
topple the Saddam regime, which would pave the way to turn an already de facto 
Kurdish state into an independent entity. After the US entered Iraq, common 
statements from Iran and Turkey increased. When the then Foreign Minister 
Abdullah Gül visited Iran in 2004 to offer his condolences for an earthquake in Iran, 
Iranian president Khatami stated ―the security of the Turkish State is also the security 
of our own. Like Turkey, we also do not want a Kurdish state in northern Iraq.‖93 
Similar emphasis was placed on the avoidance of the disintegration of Iraq to prevent 
separatism and instability in the region. 
 Turkish and Iranian concerns about the spread of unrest and nationalist 
movements among their Kurdish populations soon proved to be valid. Certain events 
occurred in both countries that reflected Kurdish unrest. Although the authorities in 
northern Iraq had long tried to assure the leaders of Iran and Turkey that they had no 
ambition to create a separate and independent Kurdish state, these events caused 
more suspicion in Turkey and Iran. In March 2004, Iraq signed an interim 
constitution that declared Kurdish as an official language and recognized the Kurdish 
authority. After this declaration, Iranian Kurds assembled to celebrate this event. 
However, the celebrations turned violent and clashes with police forces occurred. 
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This event contributed to Iran‘s fears about its Kurdish population‘s nationalist 
ambitions.
94
 
 A similar event occurred in Turkey, though not violent, one year later in 
Newroz (New Year in Kurdish) celebrations in the city of Diyarbakır. A day 
organized by the DEHAP brought famous Kurdish politicians together. The rally was 
an expression of Kurdish nationalism. During the celebration, attendants used pro-
Öcalan slogans and carried flags symbolizing Democratic Confederalism, which is 
an idea that aims to bring all Kurds in the Middle East, i.e. in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and 
Syria together under the roof a single state.
95
 These ideas presented in the rally 
showed that Turkey was justified in its suspicions that a Kurdish state in northern 
Iraq would ignite nationalism and separatist ideas within its borders.  
 The events that increased Iran‘s concerns continued with the election of 
Massoud Barzani as the first president of Iraqi Kurdistan. Following the election, it 
was reported that ―hundreds of Iranian Kurds clashed violently with police‖ in the 
town of Mahabad.
96
 One may recall that Mahabad was the city that hosted the only 
independent Kurdish state in world history. It is still dominated by the Kurdish 
population in Iran and seen as a traditional center of Kurdish nationalism. These 
events showed that Turkey‘s and Iran‘s fears of spreading unrest and nationalism 
among their Kurds appeared to come true, which was caused by the success of the 
Kurds in northern Iraq to establish an autonomous Kurdish entity.  
Escalating Terror and Concerns about the Security of the State 
 Another common realpolitik concern of Iran and Turkey regarding their 
Kurdish populations was that a successful Kurdish state in Iraq and the unrest among 
their Kurds would increase separatist terrorism within their borders. After 2004, 
terrorist attacks in both Iran and Turkey increased. What is to our interest is that both 
countries were alerted from the perspective of security of the state and territorial 
integrity and became closer to each other as a result of this realpolitik concern, which 
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provides further evidence that Turkish-Iranian relations concerning the Kurdish 
question can be explained through Realism.  
 The years following 2005 have witnessed a number of clashes between 
Iranian security forces and a Kurdish group named as PJAK (The Party of Free Life 
of Kurdistan), which is the Iranian wing of the PKK. In August 2005, in two separate 
clashes between the PJAK and the Iranian police force in the towns of Urmia and 
Oshnavieh, seven policemen were killed by the PJAK members. Following these 
clashes, the unrest spread to the Kurdish town of Saqqez. Two people died and 145 
were arrested in a rally in which protesters damaged state buildings and banks.
97
 It 
was the same week when another police officer and several Kurds died in an attempt 
by the Iranian police to save three hostages held by the PJAK. After this event, it was 
reported that the hostages were released.
98
 
 Another clash occurred between Iranian border guards and PJAK members in 
November 2005, in which one militant was killed and the other was captured. At that 
time, it was reported that during the clashes in the last months, at least 120 Iranian 
policemen were killed.
99
 The violence continued. In February 2006, several 
demonstrators among the ones who were protesting the PKK leader Öcalan‘s 
imprisonment on the anniversary of his capture were also killed.
100
 In March 2006, 
three members of Iran‘s Revolutionary Guards were killed by the PJAK.101 The next 
month, Iranian police arrested seven members of the PJAK.
102
 
 Iran‘s fight against the Iranian wing of the PKK, the PJAK, did not remain 
limited to the borders of Iran. In April 2006, Iran launched two missile attacks within 
a week into northern Iraq and bombed the shelters of the PKK that were close to the 
Iranian border.
103
 This was followed by another attack in August, in which both the 
Turkish and Iranian armies opened artillery fire on the PKK camps in Hakurk, an 
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area which stands on the intersection of the Turkish, Iranian, and Iraqi borders.
104
 
Although both the Turkish and Iranian sides refused to state it was a cooperative 
attack, it was reported that both armies opened fire simultaneously. In March 2007, 
Iran was still threatening Iraq that it would pursue the members of PJAK into 
northern Iraq if Iraq failed to expel them from border zones.
105
 
 Iran‘s fight against the Kurds was not limited to the physical level. In May 
2006, Iran became concerned about a couple of new TV stations broadcasting from 
Sweden, namely Komela TV and Rojhelat TV, which were set up by Iranian 
communists and the KDPI (Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran).
106
 Iran accused 
these TV channels of making separatist propaganda against Iran. In a similar case, 
Iran had been successful through diplomatic efforts to prevent the broadcasts of 
TISK TV, which wanted to be the voice of KDPI‘s military wing. However, this time 
the Iranian government prepared a bill that brought penalties for anyone who 
watches these two channels. It was also reported that Iranian officials had already 
started to collect satellite antennas and implement fines in many cities including 
Mahabad. In addition, the Iranian government also raised concerns about Roj TV, 
which was a channel that Turkey argued to be a mouthpiece of the PKK. These 
attempts indicated that Iran also fought against the Kurds at the cultural level.  
 Iran‘s fight against the PKK and its Iranian wing, the PJAK, and the 
agreement between Iran and Turkey to provide border security through mutual 
operations was an indication of how realpolitik concerns such as territorial integrity 
and the security of the state brought these two states closer.
107
 It is again Realism that 
provides the meaning for this closeness to overcome the Kurdish question after 
decades-long disagreement and mutual accusations between Iran and Turkey. The 
cooperative stance of both countries towards the issue marked a turning point in 
Turkish-Iranian relations. In the past decades both Turkey and Iran accused each 
other of providing support for the PKK and Mujahedeen-i Khalk respectively. 
However, we see that in January 2004, Mohammad Khatami, then Iran‘s president, 
assured Abdullah Gül that ―there would be no security threat against Turkey arising 
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from Iranian territory.‖108 This statement implied the end of Iran‘s implicit backing 
of the PKK, which created tension between Iran and Turkey in the past decades; and 
the start of an explicit fight against it. The news in July 2004 marked this starting 
point.
109
 In August 2005, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi, 
referring to the fight against the PKK, said ―Turkey and Iran are cooperating to 
protect their borders and ensure security.‖110 This cooperation between the two 
countries became even stronger in early 2007, according to an analyst, when US 
reluctance to fight the PKK in northern Iraq pushed Turkey closer to Iran for its own 
security and integrity.
111
 When Iranian President Ahmedinejad paid a visit to Turkey 
in late 2007, the fight against the PKK and the PJAK was on the agenda.
112
 
 The apparent cooperation and closeness between Iran and Turkey against the 
Kurdish threat stemming from the establishment of a Kurdish entity in northern Iraq, 
which was a realpolitik concern threatening the territorial integrity and security of 
the two states through igniting nationalism and separatism, show how the relations 
between Iran and Turkey considering the Kurdish question gained meaning through 
the lens of Realism. Besides this cooperation, Realism also offers an explanation for 
the conflict of these two powers in northern Iraq in the sense that their support for 
two main Kurdish powers in northern Iraq, the KDP and PUK, resulted in a balance 
of Turkish and Iranian powers in the region; and ―balance of power‖ is an important 
feature of Realism to explain international relations. Although Iran and Turkey were 
brought closer with the aim of securing their states and borders against the Kurdish 
threat, their conflict remained in northern Iraq. Both countries respected their areas 
of influence in northern Iraq and did not allow the other to take any measure to ruin 
the balance of power. Both the cooperation between Iran and Turkey and their efforts 
to maintain a balance of power in northern Iraq concerning the Kurdish question can 
be explained through Realism.  
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 To sum up, this part aimed to show that Turkish-Iranian relations concerning 
the Kurdish question gained meaning through the glasses of Realism, which argues 
that international relations are shaped around security of the nation states, their 
territorial integrity, and the maintenance of the balance of power. In our case, the 
emergence of a Kurdish government in northern Iraq created fears in both countries. 
These fears were realpolitik concerns that assumed that a Kurdish state in northern 
Iraq would cause unrest among the Kurdish populations in both Turkey and Iran, an 
increase in terrorism, and might eventually lead to separation. Hence, Turkey and 
Iran sought ways to cooperate against their Kurdish questions to prevent these 
―dangers.‖ Their cooperation was shaped around the principles of territorial integrity, 
the security of the state and balance of power. From this perspective, their relations 
concerning the Kurdish question are shaped around Realist traits and can be 
explained through Realism.  
 
Part II: Turkish-Syrian Relations 
 
The Kurdish Question and Turkish-Syrian Relations in the 20
th
 Century 
 It is not possible to understand the impact of the Kurdish question on 
Turkish-Syrian relations without considering two serious problems between the two 
neighbors: the Hatay (Alexandretta) problem and the water dispute. It appears that 
after the rise of the PKK, Syria used the PKK as leverage to put pressure on Turkey 
to force the country to come to terms with certain subjects. Turkey responded in the 
same manner. Hence, tension, threatening, and enforcement have never stopped 
between these two neighbors. Here, I will show what these two problems meant and 
what kind of a role the Kurdish question played.  
 The Treaty of Sevres, which marked the end of the WWI, promised a Kurdish 
state in the Middle East if the Kurds could prove to the allied powers their ability and 
will to govern themselves. However, the struggle of the new Turkish movement 
which led to the Treaty of Lausanne changed this situation. The new treaty did not 
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even mention the possibility of a Kurdish state.
113
 Instead, the Kurds were spread 
around four different states: Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.  
 It is argued that Syria, under a French mandate, tended to use the Kurdish 
question in Turkey to weaken its neighbor in the early years of the Republic; as it did 
in the 1990s through providing shelter for the PKK.
114
 Syria provided shelter for the 
Khoybun group in the 1920s, which was based in Damascus. It is known that this 
Kurdish group helped the insurgents in Turkey during the Ağrı rebellion in 1930. 
However, after international agreements and pressures, France gave up its support to 
this group.
115
  
 The Treaty of Lausanne postponed the situation of Alexandretta (known as 
Hatay today) to a later date to be arranged in bilateral discussions between Turkey 
and Syria under the French mandate. In 1939, a plebiscite was held in Alexandretta 
that resulted in approval for integration into Turkey. However, Syria declared this 
plebiscite as unacceptable, because Turkey, it argued, expelled the inhabitants of the 
city and moved its citizens there. Hence, Syrians perceived this city as their own land 
that was annexed by Turkey with the help of the French. They continued to depict 
the city as being within their borders on Syrian maps. This situation continued until 
2005, when President Beshar al-Assad gave up the territorial claim. Until then, this 
problem negatively affected the relations between Turkey and Syria.  
 As mentioned earlier, the Kurds in Turkey seemed to be silent after 1939 until 
the emergence of the PKK in the late 1970s. This date also marked new problem 
between Turkey and Syria: the water dispute. The dispute between the two countries 
concerning the water coming from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers was not new. 
However, in the early 1980s, this problem gained a new shape. Until the 1980s, 
Turkey was using these rivers for the production of electricity. Yet after 1980, the 
already existing project of GAP (South Eastern Anatolia Project) was transformed 
into a regional development program. This project planned to build a number of 
dams on these two rivers in order to provide both electricity and more land for 
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agriculture in southeastern Anatolia. This meant that less water would flow into 
Syria. This concern occupied the next two decades in the relations between Syria and 
Turkey. 
116
 
 One should note that the GAP project was much more than a water dispute 
for both Turkey and Syria. In Turkey, it became a ―national project‖ which would 
provide regional development and prosperity, as well as national unity and solidarity. 
The idea of regional development was also deriving from the rising attacks of the 
PKK. Through increasing wealth, prosperity, and the living standards of the people 
in the region, the support for terror would decrease. In this respect, the GAP project 
also became a political issue, which was used and also supported by all political 
parties during election rallies. The completion of this project was seen as 
instrumental for the economic development of the southeastern Anatolian region and 
thus for preventing terrorism.  
 Meanwhile, the GAP project can also be regarded as a power game between 
Turkey and Syria. Syria was planning to use the water of Tigris and Euphrates to 
increase irrigable lands to improve agriculture. However, according to Syria, Turkey 
was limiting the water as the upper stream country, claiming sovereignty over the 
waters of both rivers. Syria opposed this and claimed that those rivers were 
international waters and it had to receive its share. In this manner, Syria and Iraq 
(which was also suffering from the same problem) came together and managed to 
convince the Arab League to warn Turkey about this issue. The control over the 
waters, hence, was to become an international power game between Syria and 
Turkey in the following two decades.
117
 
 The physical attacks of the PKK against the Turkish army started at a time 
when Syria was left alone in front of Turkey in the above-mentioned power game. 
The Iraq-Iran war between 1980 and 1988 threw Iraq out of the game.
118
 Syria 
started to seek new ways to gain power; and PKK‘s emergence helped. Syria 
supported Abdullah Öcalan and sheltered members of the PKK within its borders and 
in the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon under its occupation. Syria‘s support created serious 
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tension with Turkey; however Syria continued its support to weaken Turkey in the 
region and to force it to come to terms with Syria.
119
 In 1989 and 1992, certain 
agreements were made between the two countries. These agreements were 
concerning the water flow to Syria and the border security between two countries. 
On these dates, Turkey promised to increase the flowing water to Syria and Syria 
promised that it would not support the PKK anymore. Yet it appears that these 
agreements were not so successful because Turkey continued to blame Syria for 
providing shelter for the PKK during the 1990s.  
 1998 was a turning point in Turkish-Syrian relations. In a period when the 
clashes between the PKK and the Turkish army reached its peak, Turkey seriously 
threatened Syria with war unless the latter stopped its support for the PKK and 
expelled Öcalan. In the face of a war with Turkey, Syria chose to reconcile.120 It 
expelled Öcalan and Turkey captured him the following year, and thereafter Turkish-
Syrian relations began to improve. In 2000 and 2001 new agreements concerning the 
water flow, border security, and trade were made, and the new president of the state, 
Beshar al-Assad, gave hope for further improvement in the relations.  
 The history of Turkish-Syrian relations until 2000 is full of tension, threats, 
and enforcement, all of which suggest that Realism is a valid theory in explaining 
these relations. It is also possible to evaluate the place of the Kurdish question in 
Turkish-Syrian relations from the same perspective. Until 2000, Syria used the PKK 
as a tool to weaken Turkey and force it to reply to Syria‘s demands, especially 
considering the water dispute. However, the relations have undergone a change with 
the beginning of 21
st
 century. The description of this change and the impact of the 
Kurdish question on the relations between Turkey and Syria are the topics of the next 
section.  
 
The Kurdish Question and Turkish-Syrian Relations after 2002 
 In the previous section, it was mentioned that Syria used the Kurdish question 
as a lever against Turkey to force it to comply with its demands concerning the water 
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dispute and territorial problems. This predicament was a good example to show that 
the impact of the Kurdish question on Turkey-Syria relations can be explained by 
Realism, because Realist theory asserts that the international arena is defined by 
anarchy, that is, nation states struggle in a power game to gain the upper hand to 
protect their interests and the security of their states and territories against others. 
After 2000, the Kurdish question continued to be a lever in the relations between 
Turkey and Syria, yet this time to improve the bilateral relations. As well as the 
disputes, the rapprochement between the two countries gained meaning through 
Realism, because the relations are still shaped around security, territorial integrity, 
and balance of power. This section aims to elaborate on this idea.  
 Similar to Iran, Syria was also very much concerned about the US attack on 
Iraq, in the sense that a decade-long de facto autonomy of the Kurds and a possible 
Kurdish state in northern Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein would ignite 
nationalism among its Kurds and lead to attempts for secessionism. As it will be put 
in detail below, the events after 2002 showed that Syria was valid in its concerns. 
Hence, to provide border security and territorial integrity, and to further improve the 
political and economic ties with Turkey, it appears that Syria used the Kurdish 
question (especially through fighting the PKK) as a tool to stand closer to Turkey.  
The Kurdish Unrest in Syria 
 The situation of the Kurds in Syria has been more or less similar to that of 
their counterparts in Turkey. They have been living in a country that refused to 
recognize them as an ethnic minority and treated them as Syrians, banning their basic 
rights such as education and publication in Kurdish. Actually, it can be argued that 
the Kurds in Syria are in a worse situation compared to the ones in Turkey. Today, it 
is estimated that there are 1.5 to 2 million Kurds living in Syria, approximately 
200,000 of whom are denied Syrian nationality; hence they live with a red identity 
card which shows that they are foreigners. They cannot vote, own property, go to 
state schools, or work for the government. In addition, there are another estimated 
100,000 Kurds who are not recognized at all, and are called the ―maktoumeen‖, a 
word meaning ―hidden‖ or ―concealed‖ in Arabic. These Kurds cannot even go to 
hospitals or get married. These Kurds, most of whom are settled in the poor northern 
provinces of Hasakah and Qamishli, maintain a low-standard of life in Syria.  
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 Although it was not likely that one would witness any rioting among the 
Kurds in Syria living under the strict Bashar regime, Kurdish unrest after 2002 was 
no surprise due to their predicament in Syria. It was late 2002 when some Syrian 
Kurds started to mention their demands for basic rights.
121
 An example case was in 
December 2002, when the leaders of the Yikiti Kurdish Party, Hasan Saleh and 
Marwan Osman, organized a demonstration attended by approximately a hundred 
Kurds demanding full citizenship and equal rights. One month later, the Syrian 
Security Court
122
 tried these two Kurdish leaders for ―fomenting sectarian issues‖.123 
 Things started to get out of control when certain Arab and Kurdish groups 
became involved in a conflict on the 12
th
 of March 2004, after a soccer game played 
in the town of Qamishli. In the riots that continued for two days following the 
conflict, it was reported that at least 15 people were killed.
124
 After these riots, during 
which the angry crowds burned vehicles and damaged buildings, schools remained 
closed for a few days due to the fear of renewed clashes in the city.
125
 After a couple 
of days, the clashes spread to Aleppo, the country‘s second largest city. On March 
18, Syrian security forces fought with a Kurdish rioting group, which reportedly 
caused the deaths of at least five Kurds and three policemen.
126
 Following this clash, 
the problem became more complicated when some Syrian Kurds opened fire on the 
homes of the police officers in northeastern Syria.
127
 During these riots, although the 
slogans of the protesters and the banners carried were calling for more rights for the 
Kurds of Syria, Syrian officials strictly denied that the demonstrations reflected 
ethnic conflict; instead, they were political games of external powers. For instance, in 
a statement he made, the Vice President Abdel-Halim Khaddam said, ―Syria‘s 
national unity would not be breached by the riots‖, and he accused ―unspecified 
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foreigners‖ of ―trying to benefit from these incidents.‖128  However, this idea was 
denied by certain Kurds. A Kurdish tribal leader, Ibrahim Darwish, implied that they 
―only want the good of [their] country‖ and that they could not be accused of 
―dealing with outsiders.‖129 In the following days, the physical tension died down, 
leaving a number of dead, wounded, and detained behind.  
 These events provided evidence for the Syrian regime that it was right in its 
concerns. The Kurdish success in northern Iraq had caused unrest among its Kurdish 
population. However, the Syrian government did not choose to improve the condition 
of the Kurds. Instead, the events evolved into clashes between the Kurdish groups 
and Syrian police forces. Syria, fearing an escalation of the movements and 
secessionism, opted for improvement of ties with Turkey to maintain its security and 
territorial integrity. From this perspective, Syria‘s cooperation with Turkey to 
crackdown on the PKK was a crucial move. 
Turkish-Syrian Cooperation against the PKK 
 A shift in tense relations between Turkey and Syria was signaled when Hafez 
al-Assad accepted to reconcile with Turkey and to expel the PKK leader, Abdullah 
Öcalan. After Hafez died and his son, Bashar, took his post, hopes were increased to 
establish warmer relations between Syria and Turkey. Certain security agreements 
were made between the two countries in 1998, 2000, and 2001. In these agreements 
Syria pledged to stop its support for the PKK. With the start of the US-led Iraqi war, 
Syria‘s fear of its own Kurds to foment unrest and secessionism increased, and an 
effective cooperation with Turkey against the PKK took place as of 2003. This was a 
strategic step by Syria to improve ties with Turkey. The next step is to show how this 
cooperation occurred. 
 The cooperation of Syria with Turkey against any kind of terrorism including 
the PKK, took place in two ways: extradition and judgment. In March 2003, two 
leading figures of the PKK in Syria and Lebanon, namely Selahattin Canavar and 
Hayri Kaner respectively, were captured and handed over to Turkey.
130
 It was 
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reported that with these two, the number of high-ranking PKK members delivered to 
Turkey increased to seven. After the bomb attacks in Istanbul in 2003, Syria captured 
and handed over to Turkey 22 suspects linked to the Al-Qaeda organization in a short 
period of time.
131
 This willingness of Syria was evaluated as a positive step for the 
rapprochement of the two countries. As a show of gratitude, Turkey even planned to 
dispatch a six-member parliamentary delegation to Syria.  
 Shortly thereafter, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad paid a historic visit to 
Turkey on the 6
th
 of January 2004. This marked a crucial point in the history of 
Turkish-Syrian relations with Assad being the first president of Syria to visit 
Turkey.
132
 Before he began his visit, Bashar stated that Turkey and Syria had serious 
problems in the past due to Syria‘s relations with the PKK, but ―now, there [were] no 
PKK activities or presence of any sort in Syria.‖133 He also mentioned that for him, 
there was no water problem between Syria and Turkey. In addition, he emphasized 
his country‘s red lines about Iraq. He asserted that the disintegration of Iraq was not 
acceptable, underlining that Syria would have ―serious concerns over any separatist 
movement by the Kurds or other groups in the country.‖134 These statements he made 
before his arrival in Turkey and his red lines were very similar to Turkey‘s and were 
reflections of the spectacular rapprochement of two countries. During Bashar‘s visit, 
another significant agreement was signed which brought the two countries even 
closer. Bashar signed an agreement about turning Hatay, the subject of a long-lasting 
dispute between the two countries into a border trade center. This important signature 
was perceived as a sign of the elimination of the Hatay problem.
135
 As a result, his 
historic visit to Turkey was assessed as ―burial of the old enmity‖ and ―opening of a 
new era‖ in Turkish-Syrian relations.136  
 After Bashar al-Assad‘s visit to Turkey, a series of trials and imprisonments 
began in Syria. In December 2004, a Syrian court sentenced a Syrian citizen of 
Kurdish origin belonging to the PKK to four years of imprisonment on the conviction 
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of ―sedition and harming relations with a friendly country.‖137 The ―friendly country‖ 
was an apparent reference to Turkey. The importance of this imprisonment was that 
it was the first example of its kind. In a short period of time, others followed. In May 
2005, the Syrian State Security Court sentenced three members of the PKK, Rashad 
Sheikhi, Abdou al-Amir, and Azad Ahmad, to two and a half years of imprisonment. 
A Syrian lawyer and human rights activist, Anwar Bunni, stated ―this [sentence] 
came because of rapprochement between Syria and Turkey.‖138  
 On the 21
st
 of July 2005, the Interior Minister of Syria Ghazi Kanaan implied 
that Syria was ―working together with Turkey to fight the terrorist group (the 
PKK).‖139 Although he did not elaborate on how his country was cooperating with 
Turkey, it seems that it was apparent as the next imprisonment of four Kurds with the 
conviction of belonging to the PKK came only five days after his statement. Syrian 
State Security Court sentenced Zakaria Rasheed, Hussein Kanbar, Mahammed 
Hassan Abdul-Rahman, and Mohamed Ma‘amou to two and a half years 
imprisonment.
140
 In the following month, the same court sentenced another three 
Kurds, namely Mustapha Khalil, Abdul-Karim Allo, and Mohammad Nouman to 30 
months in jail.
141
 In February 2006, an additional three Kurds faced imprisonment for 
the same conviction.
142
  
Transforming Relations after Public Riots in Syria 
 It is crucial here to address the change in relations between Syria and Turkey 
after the emergence of public riots against the al-Assad regime, which is perceived as 
a part of what is called the ―Arab Spring‖ in certain Arab countries such as Egypt, 
Tunis, and Libya. In March 2011, clashes began between the Syrian regime and 
dissidents, which then turned into a fight between the Syrian army and opposition 
forces throughout the country. Turkey‘s stance on these clashes has been a cautious 
one. At first, Turkey sought a way to soften the al-Assad regime and attempt certain 
reforms to establish a democracy and meet public demands. However, as the fight 
became tougher and turned into bloodshed in Syria, Turkey decided to oppose the 
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regime. Hence, the improving relations of the last decade have been turned upside 
down. As this dissertation is being written, the turmoil is still continuing in Syria. 
This is not the place to discuss an unfinished fight and its possible effects; however, 
what is to our interest here is that there is reason to believe that Syria has again 
started to play the Kurdish card against Turkey as punishment for its opposition. It is 
argued that Bashar al-Assad has been clearing the way for the PYD (Democratic 
Union Party), which is seen as a PKK affiliate, to organize in northern Syria in order 
to pose a threat against Turkey‘s fight with the PKK.143 It was reported that the PYD 
has been acting together with the Syrian regime to suppress the opposition groups in 
Syria.
144
 Mohammad Bassam Imadi, who is an opposition figure, argued that the 
allowance of Salih Muslim Muhammed (the leader of the PYD since 2010 who was 
not allowed to enter Syria before) to enter Syria was a clear sign of this 
cooperation.
145
 This move can also be evaluated as a threatening message from Syria 
to Turkey. These events prove that Syria is again using the Kurdish card against 
Turkey to compel Turkey to act with caution towards the Syrian regime.  
 The cases mentioned in this section show that as Syria‘s fears of unrest 
among its Kurdish population inspired by the Kurdish success in northern Iraq began 
to be realized, it opted to improve its ties with Turkey to prevent any possible 
Kurdish secessionist movement. In this context, Syria‘s cooperation with Turkey to 
crackdown on the PKK appeared to be a proper move for further rapprochement. The 
Kurdish card was a lever used by Syria against Turkey for enforcement throughout 
the 1990s. Since the inception of the war in Iraq, Syria used it again as a lever, yet 
this time to move closer to Turkey. The reason was with the beginning of the war in 
Iraq, Syria felt a threat against the security of its state and its territorial integrity. Yet 
after the emergence of public revolts against the Syrian regime, Syria again started to 
use the Kurdish card as a tool to punish Turkey‘s opposition to its policies. Hence, it 
is possible to argue that the evolution of the impact of the Kurdish question on 
Turkish-Syrian relations in the last two decades provides further evidence for our 
thesis that Realism is a valid theory in explaining the relations between the two 
countries, and that these relations are shaped around Realist traits as far as the 
Kurdish question is concerned. 
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Part III: Turkish-Iraqi Relations 
 
A Brief History of the Kurds in Northern Iraq 
 The history of the Kurds living in today‘s northern Iraq reserves an exclusive 
place in Kurdish studies, because the Kurds constitute the largest percentage in Iraq 
compared to other countries containing Kurdish populations.
146
 After the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement in 1916, when the Allied Powers decided on how to partition the 
Ottoman Empire, Britain established a Hashemite monarchy in Iraq without taking 
the demographic structure of the land into consideration. The British forces opted to 
control the land by providing the traditional minority Sunni powers with certain 
authority in Iraq. In the 1920s, Britain also invited Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji, who 
was a powerful Kurdish figure, to become the governor of Mosul. However, Barzinji, 
who saw himself as the king of Kurdistan, revolted against Britain. Hence, Britain 
suppressed his movement.
147
  
 In 1932, Britain granted independence to Iraq under King Faisal.
148
 Yet it also 
retained its military bases in Iraq. In 1941, a military coup occurred in Iraq. Fearing 
that its oil supplies would be cut, Britain intervened. The Anglo-Iraqi war lasted one 
month. After the war, Britain restored the Hashemite government and occupied Iraq. 
The British occupation ended in 1947. The Hashemite monarchy was only able to 
survive until 1958. The Iraqi army then took the control of the country after a coup, 
which is known as the 14 July Revolution. In 1968, the Socialist Ba‘ath Party 
assumed power in Iraq. In 1979, Saddam Hussein was to take the leadership in the 
party, and then subsequently governed the country until the 2003 war.   
 It was the early 1930s when Mullah Mustapha Barzani emerged as a leader. 
Although his fame came from his religious personality as he was a Naqshbandi 
sheikh, he soon became a national leader to most of the Kurds. His leadership led to 
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the establishment of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in 1947. He spent a 
decade in exile after 1948, during which his fame grew as he successfully led his 
followers along border areas to Russia. He returned to Iraq in 1958. His power as a 
Kurdish leader reached its peak in 1970 when he ―negotiated the March Manifesto of 
1970, which theoretically provided for Kurdish autonomy under his rule.‖149 
However, both the end of US‘s and Iran‘s support due to the concessions they 
received from Iraqi government, and Talabani‘s fight against him, he was totally 
defeated in 1975.  
 This was the date that witnessed the rise of his son, Massoud Barzani, as the 
new leader of the KDP, and Jalal Talabani, Mustapha Barzani‘s son-in-law, who 
established the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). It is not possible to say that these 
two Kurdish parties agreed with each other on all occasions. They had an ambiguous 
relationship that ―alternated between cooperation and bloody conflict.‖150  Yet they 
also continued their fight against the Saddam regime in Iraq. After the Iran-Iraq war 
between 1980 and 1988, these two groups were severely affected by Saddam‘s al-
Anfal campaign against the Kurds. In particular the infamous Halabja massacre in 
1988, in which chemical weapons were used, caused the deaths of a great number of 
Kurds. 
 Struggling with economic shortcomings, Saddam Hussein decided to invade 
Kuwait in 1990 and declared the country to be a province of Iraq. This occupation 
threatened Western powers‘ interests, especially those of the US, since Kuwait was 
an important oil-producing country. Hence, the UN demanded Iraq to withdraw its 
powers from Kuwait. Saddam rejected, and the coalition powers entered Iraq in 
1991. After Saddam‘s army was defeated, the Kurdish groups in Iraq started an 
uprising against the Iraqi regime. Saddam responded harshly, which resulted in 
another massacre. Hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees fled to Turkey, fleeing 
the wrath of Saddam. Turkey was unprepared for such a movement and failed to 
provide proper shelter for the refugees. A number of Kurds died because of 
unhealthy conditions. This humanitarian crisis attracted international attention and 
the UN passed a resolution that called for protection for the Kurds in northern Iraq. 
Following the resolution, American, Turkish, British, and French forces established a 
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no-fly zone in northern Iraq, covering the northern area of the 36
th
 parallel. This 
protection was called Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) and its forces were called 
Poised Hammer, and were settled in the Ġncirlik military base in Turkey. 
 The protected zone, which lasted until the Iraqi war in 2003, was a turning 
point for the Kurds in northern Iraq. Although Turkey strictly opposed a Kurdish 
state in northern Iraq, through the OPC, it actually helped the establishment of a de 
facto Kurdish autonomy. In 1992, the KDP and PUK managed to merge their 
interests and opted to hold elections in order to establish a parliament for a federated 
state in northern Iraq. In the end, a parliament was established which consisted of 
equal members from the KDP and PUK, and a small number of Christians.
151
 
However, this cooperation did not last long. In 1994, civil war broke out between the 
two Kurdish parties. In 1998, Washington succeeded to bring Barzani and Talabani 
together to make peace. In 2002, a reunified parliament held a meeting for the first 
time after 1994, only five months before US intervention in Iraq. An interim 
government was established to prepare a constitution. In October 2005, the 
constitution was adapted and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was 
established.  
 
The Kurdish question and Turkish-Iraqi Relations 
 The impact of the Kurdish question on Turkish-Iraqi relations has an 
important place in this study. The reason is that today‘s Iraq is the only country that 
hosts a de jure Kurdish authority. From this perspective, Turkey has had an 
ambiguous relationship with Iraq. On the one hand, Turkey long refused to recognize 
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) as an official interlocutor and hence 
turned its face towards the government in Baghdad; yet on the other hand, it was 
forced to sit on the same table with the northern Iraqi Kurds to settle crucial 
problems concerning its Kurdish question. These problems mostly concerned the 
territorial integrity of Turkey and Iraq, the security of the Turkish State, coping with 
terror, and Turkey‘s cross border military operations. Focusing on these debates, the 
main aim of this part is to show how Realism aids in explaining Turkish-Iraqi 
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relations considering the Kurdish question. To reach this target, two cases are 
chosen, which will take a picture of Turkish-Iraqi relations: the issues around Kirkuk 
and Turkey‘s military activity in Iraq due to the fights against the PKK.  
Debates around the Situation in Kirkuk 
 The debate on the political and demographic situation of Kirkuk is an 
excellent case that summarizes the Iraqi Kurds‘ ambitions, Turkey‘s stance towards 
them, and the impact of the Kurdish question on Turkish-Iraqi relations. Kirkuk is an 
oil-producing city with approximately 900,000 inhabitants from different origins 
including Kurdish, Arab, and Turcoman, situated on the northern side of Baghdad. 
After the Gulf War in 1991, Saddam managed to keep Kirkuk under his control. The 
situation of this city was of great importance to Turkey. One of the main fears of 
Turkey from the war in Iraq was the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in 
northern Iraq, which would cause unrest and secessionist movements among its 
restive Kurds. The importance of Kirkuk speaks to this point. In case Iraqi Kurds 
managed to assume power in Kirkuk, they could use the wealth of the oil-hub city to 
establish an independent state. Hence, Turkey always objected Kurdish control in 
Kirkuk and advocated its dependence on a central Iraqi government in Baghdad.  
 It was early 2003 when the Iraqi Kurds gave the first signals that they would 
return to the city of Kirkuk, even through using force if necessary, after Saddam‘s 
control over the city collapsed.
152
 However, to keep Turkey‘s suspicious focus on the 
demographic situation of the city away, Kurdish leaders continued to officially claim 
that a Kurdish flow into the city would not be a primary concern, at least until the 
war in Iraq was over.
153
 Apparently to ease Turkish concerns, the PUK leader Jalal 
Talabani said in a statement he made on 21
st
 of March 2003, that the ―PUK and KDP 
would not allow displaced Kurds to return to Kirkuk before the war ends and things 
return to normal.‖154 He also stated that his ―dream is not for Kurdistan‖, but for a 
―federal parliamentary democracy [under a unified Iraqi state].‖ These statements 
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were necessary to distract Turkish attention from the city of Kirkuk and prospects of 
the establishment of a Kurdish state. 
 Turkey‘s concerns over Kirkuk even led to the establishment of a consulting 
mechanism between Turkey, the USA, the KDP, the PUK, and the Turcomans, 
mainly to ―prevent a possible migration to cities like Kirkuk and Mosul.‖155 The 
Turcomans were also included in this mechanism because their representation in the 
city was a sensitive issue for Turkey, both in providing their security and keeping the 
balance of power in Kirkuk among different fractions. At this point, the Turcomans 
were on the side of the Turks. Ahmet Muratlı, then representative of the ITC (Iraqi 
Turcoman Front) in Turkey, implied that they ―do not want any immigration to 
Mosul or Kirkuk ... We will see the real ethnic structure of these cities.‖156 
Turcomans in Iraq shared the same concern with Turkey that the Kurds would flow 
into Kirkuk to constitute an ethnic dominance in the city. Being a majority in Kirkuk 
would allow the Iraqi Kurds to decide the fate of the city after the war and also to 
control its wealth power. This situation was unacceptable for both Turkey and for the 
Turcomans in Iraq.  
 Another important point of concern for Turkey about Kirkuk was the 
possibility of seizure of the city by the Kurdish peshmarga forces. Although the PUK 
and KDP had openly promised that their forces would not enter Mosul and Kirkuk, 
Turkey‘s unease increased due to the news arriving from the region. In April 2003, 
American newspaper Washington Post reported that the then Chief of General Staff 
of the Turkish army Hilmi Özkök was receiving ―a briefing everyday about the 
position and strength of Iraqi Kurdish militias advancing slowly toward the oil cities 
of Kirkuk and Mosul in northern Iraq‖, also reminding that ―Turkey considers 
Kurdish control of the Iraqi oil fields a security threat.‖157 Turkey‘s fears were 
realized. On April 11, 2003, it was reported that Kurdish fighters belonging to the 
PUK entered Kirkuk.
158
 This situation left Turkey with two options: to enter Iraq or 
to leave Kirkuk to the Kurds. However, a military option was not likely for Turkey, 
because it had lost its chance to do so with the parliamentary rejection of what is 
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known as the ―March 1 resolution‖, which asked for Turkish Parliament‘s permission 
to allow US forces to use Turkish lands as a military base to launch attacks against 
Iraq. Hence, Turkey was forced to rely upon US promises that it would remove 
Kurdish forces from Kirkuk. In the following days, news kept on coming from the 
region that the peshmargas were still in the city and the residents were looting 
government offices.
159
 However, the Kurdish military existence did not last long. 
Within a few days, US forces started to take control of the city of Kirkuk.
160
 Kirkuk‘s 
short term occupation by Kurdish forces and Turkey‘s response to it show the 
sensitivity of Turkey about this issue and how it sees Kurdish dominance in Kirkuk 
as a reason to enter Iraq. This is very much related to Turkey‘s fear of ―power-
gaining Kurds‖ in northern Iraq. Massoud Barzani‘s statement ―Let us be clear, we 
had agreed with the Americans that Turkey would not enter northern Iraq and in 
exchange we do not enter Kirkuk and Mosul‖161 clearly underlines the relationship 
between Kurdish dominance in Kirkuk and Turkey‘s military move into northern 
Iraq. 
 Turkey‘s concerns about Kirkuk did not end when US forces took control of 
the city. Although the city was brought under US control, it appeared that certain 
peshmarga elements remained in Kirkuk despite assurance to Turkey.
162
 In addition, 
Iraqi Kurds were not holding their promises that there would not be any effort to 
change the demographic structure of the city. On the 23
rd
 of April 2003, a crowd 
consisting of Arab men and women protested the recent actions by the Kurds in front 
of the main administrative building in Kirkuk, claiming that they were looted and 
threatened by the Kurds and forced to leave the city.
163
 Turkey‘s suspicions reached 
their peak when a retired general of the US army, Jay Garner, stated that ―Kirkuk is a 
Kurdish city‖ in a visit he paid to northern Iraq.164 Being disturbed by this statement, 
Turkey asked for an explanation from the US. After a short period of time, the Prime 
Minister of the PUK, Barham Saleh, visited Turkey to listen to Turkish concerns and 
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explain the background of the retired general‘s statement about Kirkuk.165 Although 
the official discourse remained the same, subsequent events would show that Iraqi 
Kurds would not give up on Kirkuk. Turkey‘s traditional stance towards the Kurdish 
issue, that is, to contain Kurdish threats in neighboring countries through agreements 
with either the hosting state or the great powers outside, was collapsing in Iraq. The 
US made it clear that it would not allow Turkey to take measures in Iraq with the 
infamous ―Sulaymaniyya incident‖, which is known in Turkey as the ―hood case 
(çuval olayı).‖ In July 2003, US forces detained 11 Turkish soldiers stationed in 
northern Iraq to fight the PKK and held them while putting hoods on their heads.
166
 
Besides straining US-Turkey relations, this event was a message to Turkey to find 
another way to approach to the Kurdish issue.  
 As of May 2003, Kurds in Iraq started to explicitly mention their wish to 
move Kurds back to Kirkuk. Massoud Barzani said on May 31 that ―work was under 
way to bring home Kurds expelled under Saddam Hussein‘s Arabization policy.‖167 
This statement was meaningful in the sense that it came after the election of a Kurd 
as the mayor of Kirkuk by the newly founded council of the city. On July 1, a clearer 
statement was made by Barham Saleh, saying that the Arabization policy ―must be 
reversed for Iraq to be peaceful.‖168 The French news agency AFP reported that the 
representatives of the KDP and PUK even consider Kirkuk as the capital city of 
Kurdistan.
169
 As 2003 drew to a close, news considering the ―Kurdization‖ coming 
from Kirkuk increased.
170
 These events caused escalated uneasiness in Turkey 
regarding the city. In the middle of 2004, although the Kurdish move to the city 
accelerated, Turkey was still defending the preservation of power balance in Kirkuk 
to keep Iraq unified and underlining that it would not allow any fait accompli to 
bring the city under Kurdish control.
171
  
 This was the time when conflicting statements appeared by the two most 
influential Kurdish leaders, Talabani and Barzani. In a Turkey visit, Talabani 
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asserted that ―Kurds had no intention to dominate the oil-rich city of Kirkuk‖ and 
that they were ready to share power with the Arabs and Turcomans.
172
 He was also 
insistently underlining that they do not seek the disintegration of Iraq.
173
 However, 
only two weeks after Talabani‘s remarks, Barzani ―reiterated the Kurdish claim for 
the oil-rich northern Iraq city Kirkuk‖ and said that they ―would not make any 
compromise on that.‖174 These conflicting statements and escalating dispute over the 
control of the city forced Turkey to bring this issue to the table in a regional summit 
of Iraq‘s neighbors, held in July 2004 in Cairo. Then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül 
mentioned that the status of the city was vital to Iraq‘s stability and the conflicts 
should be overcome quickly.
175
 However, nothing seemed to change to ease Turkey‘s 
concerns, as Barzani declared Kirkuk to be ―the heart of Kurdistan. We are ready to 
fight and sacrifice our soul to preserve its identity.‖176  
 Turkey‘s concerns about the situation in and the future of Kirkuk and Iraq 
continued in 2005. Fearing its own Kurds, Turkey retained its discourse, which 
strictly opposed the ―Kurdification‖ attempt in Kirkuk, which was believed to lead to 
an independent Kurdish state and disintegration of Iraq.
177
 Turkey was still 
mentioning the establishment of such a state as a cause of war. This approach of 
Turkey was very much reflected in the statements of the bureaucracy and military, 
which were perceived by Kurdish authorities in Iraq as clear interference in their 
domestic politics. Referring to the demographic changes and escalating turmoil in the 
city, Foreign Minister Gül stated on 27th of January 2005, ―spoiling the demographic 
structure of Kirkuk would be a serious threat for the future of all of Iraq. Turkey is 
very worried about the reports of the demographic manipulation.‖178 He also added: 
―Nobody should expect Ankara to sit back and watch if developments there spill 
over, destabilizing neighboring Iraq.‖ Then Deputy Chief of Staff, General Ġlker 
BaĢbuğ made a similar warning to Iraq, implying that ―tensions in Kirkuk could lead 
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to clashes in Iraq that could draw Turkey into the dispute.‖179 Turkey‘s open threats 
that it would intervene if anything happened against its interest in northern Iraq 
attracted criticism from Iraqis. Evaluating these statements as interference in 
domestic politics, then Foreign Minister of Iraqi Interim Government, Hoshyar 
Zebari, stated, ―no country has the right to speak out on Kirkuk. The people of Iraq 
will decide on the fate of Kirkuk.‖180 
 Turkish fears of a Kurdish-dominated Kirkuk appeared to come true in the 
January 30 elections held in Iraq.
181
 In the Tamim province, which includes the oil-
rich city of Kirkuk, Kurds won approximately 60% of the votes. In Kirkuk, Kurds 
gained power especially in the local elections.
182
 Turkey did not remain silent about 
this situation. Implying its discomfort regarding the results, the Turkish side stated 
that ―the elections had failed to produce a parliament truly representative of the 
people because of low turnout and the manipulation of votes in some areas, [and by 
these means] certain groups made unjust gains‖, which in fact referred to the Kurdish 
victory in the elections.
183
 To these claims, Zebari responded, ―Turkey should not 
worry about the Kurdish success in the Iraqi elections, as Iraq will remain a country 
having friendly ties with neighboring Turkey.‖184 This statement was addressing 
Turkey‘s concerns regarding Kurdish separatism in northern Iraq that was feared to 
ignite unrest among the Kurds in Turkey. 
 After the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq, a 
referendum date was set as December 2007 to decide the fate of Kirkuk, whether to 
integrate it into the autonomous Kurdish region. As 2006 drew to a close, the 
importance of Kirkuk for Iraqi Kurds found its reflection in the words of the 
spokesman of the Iraqi Kurdish autonomous regional parliament, Adnan Mufti: 
―Iraqi Kurds consider Kirkuk to be a red line.‖185 This statement gives a clue about 
how Iraqi Kurds were determined to seize power in the oil-hub city. Meanwhile, 
tension was continuously escalating in the region. Hence, in December 6, 2006, an 
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American study group headed by former US Republican Secretary of State James A. 
Baker and former Democratic Congressman Lee Hamilton presented to George W. 
Bush a report regarding the situation in Kirkuk.
186
 In this report, the group suggested 
the postponement of the referendum in Kirkuk, because ―a referendum on the future 
of Kirkuk would be explosive ... given the very dangerous situation in [the city].‖187 
The regional Kurdish Parliament in Arbil immediately assembled with an 
extraordinary agenda and declared that it rejected the report.
188
 In the beginning of 
2007, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan warned Iraqi Kurdish groups that they should 
not try to assume control of Kirkuk, and said that ―Turkey would not stand by amid 
growing tensions among ethnic Turkmens, Arabs, and Kurds in [Kirkuk].‖189 This 
statement indicated that Turkey‘s anti-Kurdish stance to the issue continued. 
Erdoğan‘s statements faced harsh criticism from the Iraqi side. Iraq‘s deputy prime 
minister, Bahram Saleh, implied that Iraq was trying to improve its relations with 
Turkey, but this required ―respecting Iraqi sovereignty. For Turkey ... interfering in 
domestic affairs of Iraq is utterly unacceptable.‖ He added: ―This is fundamentally a 
matter for the people of Iraq, nobody else.‖190  
 The debates around the fate of Kirkuk seemed to slow down after the 
referendum was postponed to an undetermined date. However, these debates 
beautifully summarize how Turkey‘s relations with Iraq are influenced by the 
Kurdish question. Kirkuk is an oil-rich city; hence its control was a matter of dispute. 
Iraqi Kurds argued that it was a Kurdish city, yet Saddam‘s Arabization policy in the 
1990s had driven the Kurds away from the city. After the US-led war, Kurds wanted 
to go back and take the control of the city. Fearing that this move would provide a 
base for the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, which 
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would stir Turkey‘s already restive Kurds, Turkey was strictly opposed to it. Turkey, 
which feared a Kurdish secessionism in its territory, openly stated that it viewed 
Kurdish rule as a threat to its security. Turkey apparently approached this issue in 
northern Iraq from the perspective of security of the state and territorial integrity, 
which led its interference to domestic politics in Iraq – which are among the main 
tenets of Realist IR theory to explain international relations. From this perspective, 
focusing on the evolution of the events in Kirkuk and Turkey‘s stance to them, it is 
possible to argue that Realism is the theory that explains the Turkish-Iraqi relations 
considering the Kurdish question. 
The Fight against the PKK and Turkey‟s Blurring Red Lines 
 The next step in this section is to take a picture of Turkey‘s changing 
approach to the Kurdish authority in northern Iraq and show how its so-called ―red 
lines‖ have been blurring in recent years. Focusing on Turkey‘s search for 
overcoming the PKK problem, this section shows that Turkey‘s ―security of the 
state‖ approach in dealing with its Kurdish question, which caused the denial of the 
Kurdish existence in northern Iraq before, now becomes a reason for rapprochement.  
 It was mentioned before that Turkey traditionally opposed the establishment 
of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq and declared this as a ―casus belli.‖ 
Hence, after the 2003 Iraqi war, Turkey insistently underlined the importance of 
keeping Iraq united. Turkey, in its stance to Iraq, both during the interim government 
period and after the establishment of the permanent Iraqi government, paid attention 
to use the government in Baghdad as an official interlocutor. Although Turkey held 
many talks with Iraqi Kurds during this period, it did this via mentioning the Kurds 
as members of the Baghdad government. Turkey, until very recently, never saw the 
autonomous Kurdish authority in northern Iraq as an official interlocutor. This policy 
was parallel to Turkish traditional fears and discourse. The recognition of a Kurdish 
authority was perceived by Turkey as the same as the recognition of a Kurdish entity, 
which would then affect its own Kurds. However, it is apparent that this stance has 
been changing recently. Turkey‘s red lines are blurring. Turkish authorities are 
accepting the reality that they have to sit on the table with Iraqi Kurds, after 
recognizing them as the rulers of northern Iraq, and only then it can solve its 
problems within the region. Turkey‘s struggle to contain the threat of the PKK in the 
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last decade is a good example of this change. To provide the security of its state, 
Turkey now tries to overcome this problem through cooperation with the northern 
Iraqi government, contrary to its traditional policy to ignore that authority.  
 The rejection of the March 1 resolution in the Turkish Parliament meant in a 
way that Turkey was ―out of the game‖ in Iraq. Turkey lost its chance to have a say 
in the future of Iraq. To overcome its concerns, such as the protection of Turcomans, 
the provision of power balance in Kirkuk (to not to leave it to Kurdish hands), the 
prevention of an independent Kurdish state, and the destruction of the PKK bases in 
mountainous northern Iraq; Turkey had no choice but to put pressure on the 
American and Iraqi governments.
191
 Although some attempts were made by the US 
to use Turkish soldiers in Iraq, the Iraqis (especially the Kurds) were strictly against 
a Turkish military presence in Iraq, so that the US had to step back from this 
decision. As a result, Turkey insistently pressured the US and Iraq to fight the PKK 
in northern Iraq. Yet, while doing this, it failed to address Kurdish authority in 
northern Iraq. 
 In 2006, a trilateral mechanism was established to ease Turkish concerns and 
act against the PKK presence in northern Iraq.
192
 At the table were Turkey, the USA, 
and Iraq. However, this mechanism never started to act properly. The main reason 
was Turkey‘s reluctance to recognize Iraqi Kurds as the representatives of the KRG. 
The USA and Iraq wanted to use Iraqi Kurds in this mechanism; however, Turkey 
wanted to view these Kurds under a central Baghdad government. Yet the Kurds 
were expecting Turkey to accept them as the officials of the Kurdistan Regional 
Government. Hence stuck in a deadlock, the mechanism never worked. Another 
important reason of the failure of this mechanism was Turkish military‘s strict 
approach to the Iraqi Kurds as ―one and the same‖ with the PKK.193 The Turkish 
military argued that the PKK had the ―Iraqi Kurdish leadership‘s full backing.‖ As a 
concrete example for that, Murat Karayılan‘s speech on a Barzani-controlled TV 
                                                             
191 Turkey also managed to receive certain promises. For instance, see: The New York Times, U.S. 
Will Help Turks Stop Kurdish Inroads From Iraq, April 25, 2006. Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/25/world/middleeast/25cnd-
rice.html?hp&ex=1146024000&en=0fbb5a6bcbcd719e&ei=5094&partner=homepage&gwh=55EB81
76FF8BA2A3E2C2FF439F5FECA9 
192 Hürriyet Daily News, Iraqi Kurd representation may jeopardize tripartite PKK talks, September 
13, 2006. 
193 Hürriyet Daily News, PKK and Iraqi Kurds are „one and the same,‟ Turk military believes, 
November 19, 2006. 
67 
 
channel was shown. This lack of confidence between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds 
lead to rejection of their representation, which in turn caused the collapse of the 
mechanism.  
 The rejection of Kurdish representatives by Turkey left the problems without 
a solution. Turkey was insisting on its traditional discourse. Turkey again turned its 
face towards the government in Iraq. It also managed to get promises from the Iraqi 
government to not allow any terrorist organization to operate from Iraqi lands.
194
 
However, what the Iraqi government did could not be more than President Talabani‘s 
―asking‖ the PKK to stop fighting.195 In October 2007, Jalal Talabani openly 
admitted that Baghdad would be ―unable to hand over the leaders of the PKK.‖196 It 
appears that the Iraqi Kurds were determined to force Turkey to sit on the table with 
the representatives of the KRG. The same month, Talabani made another statement 
arguing that Turkey‘s fight against the PKK could not be complete without ―active 
involvement of Iraqi Kurds in diplomatic talks.‖ Barham Saleh openly mentioned 
that ―Ankara should accept a Kurdish regional government in northern Iraq as a 
political interlocutor to resolve the problem over the PKK‘s presence in Iraq.‖197 
Saleh also added that Turkey‘s rejection of KRG officials in tripartite meetings was 
unacceptable and that the KRG was the one ―with the de facto authority on the 
ground. If you want a solution, we cannot sideline the KRG.‖198  
 Turkey‘s stubbornness in refusing to accept the Kurdish entity continued even 
after it became apparent that there would be no solution to the PKK problem without 
its help. Following its traditional approach to the issue, Turkey decided to launch a 
ground military operation into northern Iraq after escalating terrorist attacks in late 
2007. It started with air force bombings of PKK shelters in northern Iraq, which was 
followed by land forces‘ incursion into the region on the 21st of February 2008. At 
first, the US did not oppose. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that US had 
―full solidarity with Turkey on the PKK issue.‖199 Amid criticisms from the Baghdad 
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government, the Turkish side also declined to give a schedule of the military 
operation.
200
 However, one week after the ground operation started, George W. Bush 
personally intervened to ―urge Turkey to withdraw as quickly as possible.‖201 The 
following day, the Turkish military announced that it has finished its operation in 
northern Iraq. Turkey‘s last ground operation to Iraq lasted only 8 days.  
 Turkey‘s military operation did not put an end to the PKK‘s existence in 
northern Iraq. Apparently Turkish authorities came to accept the reality that the 
traditional approach to the Kurdish entity in northern Iraq would not provide benefit 
for Turkey any more. In accordance, the first signals of change in the Turkish official 
stance to Kurdish authority came in April 2008. Then Turkish Foreign Minister, Ali 
Babacan, implied that ―Turkey will seek closer cooperation with the Kurdish leaders 
of northern Iraq to curb outlawed PKK members from taking refuge in their region.‖ 
He also added: ―In the coming days, you can expect increasing contacts on various 
levels with the administration of northern Iraq.‖202 These remarks were signaling a 
softening on Turkey‘s opposing stance to Iraqi Kurdish authority. On October 30, 
2009, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu paid a historic visit to Arbil that ―marked a 
big step toward normalization of Turkey‘s relations with the KRG.‖203 In June 2010, 
Barzani paid a visit to Ankara, pledging ―all efforts to stop PKK violence‖, yet also 
underlining Iraqi Kurds‘ ―reluctance to fight their kins.‖204 In September 2011, 
Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Feridun Siniroğlu paid a two-day visit to Iraq, this 
time holding talks with both Talabani and Barzani, in order to provide their help to 
fight the PKK within Iraq.
205
 Ankara also demanded from Barzani to cut PKK‘s 
logistic channels. In November, Massoud Barzani came to Istanbul on Turkey‘s 
invitation to ―discuss possible means to jointly fight the PKK.‖206  
 This traffic of official visits occurring between Baghdad, northern Iraq, and 
Turkey apparently indicates the blurring of Turkey‘s traditional red lines. Recently, 
Turkey seems to have decided to recognize and cooperate with the Kurdish authority 
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in northern Iraq, mainly to fight the PKK and maintain its security and territorial 
integrity. Hence, it is possible to argue that Turkey has opted for a change, from 
denial to recognition of the Kurdish entity in northern Iraq, for the same reason of its 
refusal before: security of the Turkish State and provision of its territorial integrity. 
From this point of view, Realism offers help to understand the impact of the Kurdish 
question on Turkish-Iraqi relations. 
 
Conclusion 
 The main aim of this chapter was to show that Turkey‘s relations with its 
Middle Eastern neighbors containing Kurdish populations, i.e. Iran, Syria, and Iraq, 
are shaped around Realist traits and can be explained through the lens of Realism as 
far as the Kurdish question is concerned. It is argued that the impact of the Kurdish 
question on Turkey‘s relations has been around the principles of security of the state, 
territorial integrity, and balance of power, which include enforcement, threat, 
interference in domestic affairs, and military intervention; which are among the main 
features of Realism. As well as the disputes, the cooperation of Turkey with its 
neighbors concerning the Kurdish question can also be explained by Realism, in the 
sense that they occur to protect the interests and territory of these states and provide 
their security. 
 Turkey and Iran have similar Kurdish problems, yet at different levels. These 
two neighbors long suspected each other of using certain groups such as the PKK 
and Mujahedeen-i Khalk against each other. Both also saw their Kurdish problems as 
ones that can be solved through cooperating with other states. From this perspective, 
Turkey and Iran have signed a number of security agreements, which Turkey 
believed would provide security along its Iranian border. However, mutual 
suspicions and tension continued. The US-led war in Iraq and the possibility of the 
emergence of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq changed the way 
Turkish-Iranian relations were headed. Both countries established better relations and 
improved cooperation against the Kurdish question, fearing that unrest among their 
restive Kurds would threaten their territorial integrity and the security of their states.  
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 Turkey‘s relations with Syria were also filled with tension until the late 
1990s. Two main problems between two countries, namely the Hatay (Alexandretta) 
problem and the water dispute, long occupied an important place in their relations. In 
the power game between Turkey and Syria, the latter used the Kurdish card as a lever 
against Turkey, through providing shelter and support for the PKK, to weaken 
Turkey‘s power in the region. Yet after the Iraqi war in 2003, Syria decided to 
cooperate with Turkey to help it overcome its own PKK problem. The reason was 
that Syria also feared, as did Turkey, that its own Kurds would seek more rights and 
even independence; inspired by the success of the Kurds in Iraq. From this 
perspective, Syria continued to use the Kurdish card as a tool, yet this time to 
establish closer ties with Turkey. It appears that focusing on the Kurdish question, 
Syrian-Turkish relations were also shaped around the principles of security of the 
state, territorial integrity, and balance of power.  
 The impact of the Kurdish question on Turkish-Iraqi relations reserved an 
exclusive place in this study, because Iraq is the only country in which Kurds have 
de jure authority. Hence, Turkey had an ambiguous relationship with the Kurds in 
Iraq. On the one hand, Turkey feared that recognition of the Kurdish entity in 
northern Iraq would cause unrest and secessionist movements among its Kurds; it 
thus refused to accept the de facto or de jure Kurdish authority as an interlocutor and 
turned its face towards the Baghdad government. Yet on the other hand, it came to 
realize that it would not be able to overcome its problems concerning its Kurdish 
question without the help of the Kurdish authority in Iraq. Turkey long tried to deal 
with the PKK problem through seeking agreement with the Iraqi government and 
USA; which was a period including threat, tension, and interference in domestic 
affairs and military intervention. The debate around the demographic and political 
situation of Kirkuk and military existence of Turkey in northern Iraq were good 
examples describing Turkish-Iraqi relations. Turkey, after refusing for a long time to 
recognize the Kurdish authority in northern Iraq because of its fears about its own 
Kurds, recently came to change its red lines for the same concerns. It is possible to 
argue that to provide security of the state and its territorial integrity, Turkey has 
started to view the Kurdish authority in northern Iraq as an official interlocutor and 
to seek cooperation with it to overcome its problems concerning the Kurdish 
question. 
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 As was presented in detail in this chapter, Turkey‘s relations with its Middle 
Eastern neighbors concerning the Kurdish question are shaped around the principles 
of security of the state, territorial integrity, and balance of power, which include 
enforcement, threat, interference in domestic affairs, and military intervention; as 
well as cooperation. Hence, the evidence provided in this chapter contributes to our 
thesis, focusing on the Kurdish question; Turkey‘s relations with its Middle Eastern 
neighbors are influenced by Realist traits and can be explained through Realism.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This study started with the hypothesis that the Kurdish question has different 
effects on Turkey‘s relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors and the European 
Union. Using International Relations‘ two major theories, Realism and Liberalism, it 
was argued that the impact of the Kurdish question on Turkey‘s relations is parallel 
to the type of international systems with which it interacts. This study evaluated the 
system in the EU as a liberal one. Hence, it was proven that the Turkish-EU relations 
considering the Kurdish question could be evaluated from the perspective of 
Liberalism. Meanwhile, the international system in the Middle East is more 
appropriately explained by Realism. Therefore, the impact of the Kurdish question 
on Turkey‘s relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors was shaped around Realist 
traits and explained by Realism. Testing this hypothesis constituted the main body of 
this study. Besides shedding light on the last decade of Turkey‘s foreign relations, 
this study also contributes to the literature in the sense that it takes a picture of 
Turkey‘s relations with two different international systems, the EU and Middle East, 
via focusing on the transnational Kurdish question and using two different theories. 
The data to test the hypothesis was obtained through newspaper scans. For this task a 
widely respected English-language newspaper Hürriyet Daily News was selected. A 
detailed search in the Internet archives of the newspaper covered the news about 
Turkey, Kurds, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the EU, between November 2002 and April 
2012. In addition, The New York Times, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Radikal, 
and Zaman newspapers were also used. Then, the data was organized and analyzed.  
 I confidently argue the results in this study strongly support the argument in 
the starting hypothesis. The theoretical framework in the first chapter stated that we 
have two ways of looking at the foreign relations of Turkey: if they are shaped 
around ―human rights‖ and ―justice‖, ―freedom of expression‖ and ―political 
freedom‖, ―cultural freedom‖ and ―freedom of language‖, ―citizenship rights‖ and 
―civic citizenship‖, then Liberalism is a proper theory to understand these relations. 
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If they are shaped around ―security of the state‖, ―territorial integrity‖ and ―balance 
of power‖, which may on the one hand include enforcement, threat, and interference 
in domestic affairs and military intervention; yet on the other hand may lead to 
cooperation, then Realism would be the most relevant theory to explain these 
relations. Throughout the research, this definition was followed.  
 The data collected for Turkish-EU relations considering the Kurdish question 
provides clear support for the idea that Liberalism offers an explanation for these 
relations. In Chapter II, I organized this data under four main titles, each of which 
dealt with a different aspect of the Kurdish question in Turkey. The first title was 
―the retrial of Abdullah Öcalan‖, which discussed the perception of the PKK and its 
leader in Turkey on the one hand and the EU‘s approach to the issue from the 
perspectives of ―human rights‖ and ―justice‖ on the other. The second title was 
―closure of the Kurdish parties and banning Kurdish politicians‖, which evaluated 
the Kurdish question in Turkish politics and the EU‘s approach to the problem from 
the perspectives of ―freedom of expression‖ and ―political freedom‖. The third title 
was ―the usage of the Kurdish language‖, which shed light on the cultural aspect of 
the Kurdish question and the EU‘s approach from the perspectives of ―cultural 
freedom‖ and ―freedom of language‖. The fourth and last title was ―the debates 
around the law 5233‖, which emphasized the state policies concerning the Kurdish 
question and the EU‘s approach to the issue from the perspectives of ―citizenship 
rights‖ and ―civic citizenship‖. These four sections demonstrated that Turkey‘s 
relations with the EU, as far as the Kurdish question is concerned, are shaped around 
liberal traits and can be explained by Liberalism.   
 Chapter III focuses on Turkey‘s relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors. 
Iran, Iraq, and Syria were selected for this study, since the Kurdish population in the 
Middle East is spread among these countries. The data collected for this chapter 
indicated a different type of relationship compared to the one with the EU. This time, 
the Kurdish question was influencing Turkey‘s relations around the ―security of the 
state‖, ―territorial integrity‖, and ―balance of power‖; rather than ―human rights‖, 
―freedom‖, and ―justice.‖ To show how Turkey‘s relations are shaped with each 
neighbor, I divided the chapter into three parts; focusing on Iran, Syria, and Iraq. 
And each part consisted of two sections, focusing on the history of Turkey‘s relations 
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with the country, especially concerning the Kurdish question; and the shape Turkey‘s 
relations have taken in the last decade. In this sense, Chapter III gave me the chance 
to take a picture of Turkey‘s relations with the Middle East considering the Kurdish 
question. 
 The US-led war in Iraq in 2003 was an important event that concerned all 
Middle Eastern countries. One of the greatest concerns of Turkey was the 
establishment of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Turkey believed this 
would inevitably cause unrest and secessionist movements among its already restive 
Kurds. Hence, it appears that until very recently, Turkish official discourse mainly 
opposed anything ―Kurdish‖ in northern Iraq. Turkey was not alone in this sense. 
Iran and Syria also contain Kurdish populations and they had similar concerns as 
Turkey. Since all countries perceived a Kurdish state as a security threat, the war in 
Iraq and the growing Kurdish concern brought Turkey closer with Iran and Syria. 
Turkey‘s decades-long tension and disagreement with these countries concerning the 
Kurdish question now turned into a close cooperation to keep the Kurds under 
control. This cooperation was especially seen in the measures taken against the PKK 
in Iran and Syria. However, it was also touched upon in Chapter III that Turkey‘s 
relations with Syria again changed direction after the public riots started in Syria in 
2011. 
 Turkey‘s relations with Iraq constitute a special place. Today, Iraq is the only 
country that hosts a Kurdish political entity. Knowing well that Turkey had 
traditionally followed an anti-Kurdish stance in northern Iraq, it was quite interesting 
to track changes in Turkish policy regarding the Iraqi Kurds. Turkey refused to 
recognize any Kurdish entity in northern Iraq for a long time. This would mean, 
according to Turkey, it was treated the same as the recognition of a Kurdish state 
controlling northern Iraq. Turkey always tried to make the Baghdad government as 
the official interlocutor, which also included the Kurdish authorities. However, 
Baghdad was far from asserting any control in northern Iraq. Turkey unsuccessfully 
tried to overcome its PKK problem without addressing the northern Iraqi Kurds and 
even launched a ground attack into northern Iraq on its own authority and alone. 
Turkey acted on the concerns of its security and territorial integrity. After the 
military incursion, Turkey‘s red lines started to blur. For the same reason before, that 
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is, to provide its security and territorial integrity, Turkey started to address the 
Kurdish authority in northern Iraq and seek cooperation with it. Until very recently, 
Turkey held on to its traditional anti-Kurdish stance in northern Iraq, which was 
evaluated in detail through focusing on debates around Kirkuk in Chapter III.  
 This study showed that the Kurdish question influences Turkey‘s relations 
with the Middle East around the principles of ―security of the state‖, ―territorial 
integrity‖, and ―balance of power‖. From this perspective, Realism explains these 
relations. It is not possible to see that Liberal principles like ―human rights‖, 
―freedom‖, and ―justice‖ are as effective as the Realist principles in Turkey‘s 
relations with Iran, Iraq, and Syria. In contrast, Turkey-EU relations concerning the 
Kurdish question are occupied by concerns like ―human rights‖, ―freedom‖, and 
―justice‖, which can be explained by Liberalism. This shows us that Turkey‘s 
relations with these two different systems are shaped differently. As a result, this 
study provides proof for the starting hypothesis concerning the Kurdish question, that 
Turkey‘s relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors and the EU differ parallel to the 
type of international systems it interacts with; which can be explained through 
Realist and Liberal IR theories respectively. 
 In addition to these, the results I reached through this research allows me to 
draw two further conclusions. The first one pertains to the applicability of the two 
mainstream IR theories I used in international politics. The present research shows 
that neither of these theories is universally applicable. In the case of Turkey, through 
focusing on the Kurdish question, this thesis makes it clear that Turkey‘s relationship 
with two different international systems, both of which concern the same issue, can 
be explained by using two different theories. The main reason behind this is because 
Turkey‘s foreign relations cannot be reduced to a single level (to the nation-state 
level, for instance); instead, what establishes Turkey‘s position in the international 
arena is defined also by its interaction in another levels (e.g. the EU). As a result, it is 
impossible to comprehensively analyze Turkey‘s foreign affairs without taking into 
consideration its position with respect to different international structures. Since 
different international systems require different theories to be used to explain one 
state‘s relations with others, neither of these theories is enough by itself to offer a 
sufficient explanation for international relations. In any other case, including outside 
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of Turkey, I believe, this point should be taken into consideration to establish 
comprehensive analyses of international relations. 
 The second conclusion I draw is more related to further research. The present 
thesis does not investigate the motives behind the mentioned international politics. It 
only mentions two different international structures and discusses Turkey‘s position 
between them while focusing solely on a specific issue. However, it is also crucial to 
ask the question of why, for instance, the EU is qualified as a representative of 
Liberal IR theory, and why the Middle East of Realist IR theory. Here, I feel myself 
obliged to borrow Alexander Wendt‘s term of ―political culture‖, where he explains 
that there are three structures of international systems that cause different 
international politics to occur: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian.
207
 He argues that 
―the structure of the international system is its ‗culture‘‖, which he calls ―political 
culture.‖208  He goes on: ―Its political culture is the most fundamental fact about the 
structure of an international system, giving meaning to power and content to 
interests.‖209 From this perspective, studying these political cultures helps to develop 
a better understanding of different international politics, which is also applicable to 
this research. This constructivist approach of Wendt allows one to ask certain 
questions that this dissertation presently keeps out of its scope. To give very broad 
examples, one question is that of what makes Europe able to approach to the Kurdish 
question from the perspectives of human rights, freedom, and justice. Another 
question considers Turkey via asking why the present government was looking for a 
solution to the Kurdish question under the umbrella of the EU in the early 2000s. 
One last question may ask why Kurds‘ rights cannot become a main factor that 
shapes, just like the concerns around security and balance of power, the relations 
among Middle Eastern countries concerning the Kurds. If one imagines this study as 
one on the horizontal axis, further questions similar to those mentioned above from a 
constructivist perspective would provide the vertical dimension of the issue that 
would give a broader understanding. However, from the point of view of this thesis, 
this point is addressed as further research projects. 
 
                                                             
207 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press (Virtual 
Publishing), 2003, p. 249. 
208 Ibid., p. 250. 
209 Ibid., p. 250. 
77 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Books 
BAYLIS, John; SMITH, Steve and OWENS, Patricia (2008) The Globalization of 
World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford University Press. 
BRUINESSEN, Martin van (1992) Agha, Shaikh, and State: The Social and Political 
Structures of Kurdistan, London, Atlantic Highlands, N.J, Zed Books. 
CĠZRE, Ümit (2002) AP-Ordu İlişkileri: Bir İkilemin Anatomisi [Justice Party-
Military Relations: Anatomy of a Dilemma], ĠletiĢim Yayınları. 
DAVUTOĞLU, Ahmet (2009) Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye‟nin Uluslararası Konumu 
[Strategic Depth: Turkey‘s International Location], Küre Yayınları. 
DUNNE, Tim; KURKI, Milja and SMITH, Steve eds. (2010) International Relations 
Theories: Discipline and Diversity, New York, Oxford University Press.  
DURAN, Burhanettin; ĠNAT, Kemal and ÖZCAN, Mesut (2011) Türk Dış Politikası 
Yıllığı 2010 [Turkish Foreign Policy Almanac 2010], SETA Yayınları. 
ERALP, Atila, and DAǦI, Ġhsan D. (1996) Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik: Uluslararası 
İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar [State, System and Identity: Basic Approaches in 
International Relations], ĠletiĢim Yayınları. 
ERGIL, Doğu (2009) Kürt Raporu: Güvenlik Politikalarından Kimlik Siyasetine 
[The Kurd Report: From Security Policies to Identity Politics], Ġstanbul, TimaĢ 
Yayınları. 
GUNTER, Michael M. (1990) The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma, Westview 
Special Studies on the Middle East, Boulder, Colo, Westview Press. 
——— (1997) The Kurds and the Future of Turkey, New York, St. Martin‘s Press.  
——— (2008) The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem 
in Iraq and Turkey, New York, Palgrave Macmillan. 
78 
 
GUZZINI, Stefano and LEANDER, Anna eds. (2006) Constructivism and 
International Relations : Alexander Wendt and His Critics, London, New York, 
Routledge. 
HALE, William (1994) Turkish Politics and the Military, Routledge.  
HOUSTON, Christopher (2008) Kurdistan: Crafting of National Selves, New York, 
Berg. 
ĠNAT, Kemal; DURAN, Burhanettin and ATAMAN, Muhittin eds. (2010) Dünya 
Çatışmaları: Çatışma Bölgeleri ve Konular [World Conflicts: Conflict Areas and 
Topics], Vol. 1, Nobel Yayın. 
KANT, Immanuel Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf [To Eternal 
Peace: A Philosophical Draft]. 
KIRIġÇI, Kemal and WINROW, Gareth M. (1997) The Kurdish question and 
Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict, Frank Cass. 
KÖSEBALABAN, Hasan (2011) Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and 
Globalization, Palgrave MacMillan.  
MANAFY, A. (2005) The Kurdish Political Struggles in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey: A 
Critical Analysis, Lanham, University Press of America. 
MCDOWALL, David (2004) A Modern History of the Kurds: Third Edition, I. B. 
Tauris. 
MORGENTHAU, Hans J. (1960) Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power 
and Peace, New York: Knopf. 
NATALI, Denise (2005) The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in 
Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East, 
Syracuse, N.Y, Syracuse University Press. 
OLSON, Robert W. (1998) The Kurdish question and Turkish-Iranian Relations: 
From World War I to 1998, Kurdish Studies Series No. 1, Costa Mesa, Calif, Mazda 
Publishers. 
79 
 
——— (2005) Türkiye-İran İlişkileri, 1979-2004: Devrim, İdeoloji, Savaş, Darbeler 
ve Jeopolitik [Turkey-Iran Relations, 1979-2004: Revolution, Ideology, War, Coups 
and Geopolitics], Ankara, Babil Yayıncılık. 
ORAN, Baskın (1989) Kenan Evren‟in Yazılmamış Anıları [Kenan Evren‘s 
Unwritten Memoirs], Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi. 
——— ed. (2010) Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with 
Documents, University of Utah Press. 
SPYER, Jonathan (2008) The Rise of Nationalism: The Arab World, Turkey, and 
Iran, The Making of the Middle East Series, Philadelphia, Mason Crest Publishers. 
SULLIVAN, Michael P. (2001) Theories of International Relations: Transition vs. 
Persistence, New York, Palgrave.   
VALI, Abbas (2011) Kurds and the State in Iran: The Making of Kurdish Identity, 
London, New York, IB Tauris. 
WALTZ, Kenneth N. (2001) Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, 
Columbia University Press. 
——— (1979) Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
WEBER, Cynthia (2001) International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction, 
London, New York, Routledge.  
WENDT, Alexander (2003) Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge 
University Press (Virtual Publishing). 
WILLIAMS, Michael C. (2005) The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International 
Relations, New York, Cambridge University Press.  
——— ed. (2007) Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in 
International Relations, New York, Oxford University Press. 
YEĞEN, Mesut (2006) Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu [The Kurdish question in 
State Discourse], Ġstanbul, ĠletiĢim Yayınları. 
80 
 
——— (2006) Müstakbel Türk‟ten Sözde Vatandaşa: Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler [From 
Future Turks to So-Called Citizens: Republic and Kurds], Ġstanbul, ĠletiĢim 
Yayınları. 
——— (2011) Son Kürt İsyanı [The Last Kurdish Insurrection], Ġstanbul, ĠletiĢim 
Yayınları. 
Journal Articles 
ATAMAN, Muhittin (Oct. 2002) Özal Leadership and Restructuring of Turkish 
Ethnic Policy in the 1980s, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 123-142. 
AYDIN, Mustafa (Oct. 1999) Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical 
Framework and Traditional Inputs, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4, Seventy-
Five Years of the Turkish Republic, pp. 152-186. 
BARKEY, Henri (Spring 1996) Turkey, Islamic Politics, and the Kurdish question, 
World Policy Journal, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 43-52. 
——— and FULLER, Graham E. (Winter 1997) Turkey‟s Kurdish question: Critical 
Turning Points and Missed Opportunities, Middle East Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 
59-79. 
BAYAT, Kaveh (Winter 2005) The Ethnic Question in Iran, Middle East Report, 
No. 237, pp. 42-45. 
——— (Summer 2008) Iran and the “Kurdish question”, Middle East Report, No. 
247, The Kurds and the Future, pp. 28-35. 
BOLUKBASI, Süha (Winter 1997) Ankara‟s Baku-Centered Transcaucasia Policy: 
Has it failed?, Middle East Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 80-94. 
——— (Autumn 1999) Behind the Turkish-Israeli Alliance: A Turkish View, Journal 
of Palestine Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 21-35. 
BROWN, James (Sept. 1995) The Turkish Imbroglio: Its Kurds, Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 541, Small Wars, pp. 116-
129. 
81 
 
CARKOGLU, Ali and EDER, Mine (Jan. 2001) Domestic Concerns and the Water 
Conflict over the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 
1, pp. 41-71. 
DAGI, Ihsan D. (Jan. 2001) Human Rights, Democratization and the European 
Community in Turkish Politics: The Özal Years, 1983-87, Middle Eastern Studies, 
Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 17-40.  
DRIVER, G. R. (1922) Studies in Kurdish History, Bulletin of the School of Oriental 
Studies, University of London, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 491-511. 
EDMONDS, C. J. (1971) Kurdish Nationalism, Journal of Contemporary History, 
Vol. 6, No. 1, Nationalism and Separatism, pp. 87-97 + 99-107. 
ELPHINSTON, W. G. (Jan. 1946) The Kurdish question, International Affairs 
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944 –), Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 91-103. 
ELVER, Hilal (Summer 2005) Reluctant Partners: Turkey and the European Union, 
Middle East Report, No. 235, Middle East Research & Information Project, pp. 24-
29. 
ENTESSAR, Nader (Oct. 1984) The Kurds in Post-Revolutionary Iran and Iraq, 
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 911-933. 
ESKANDER, Saad (Nov. 2000) Britain‟s Policy in Southern Kurdistan: The 
Formation and the Termination of the First Kurdish Government, 1918-1919, British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 139-163. 
GRESH, Alain (Spring 1998) Turkish-Israeli-Syrian Relations and Their Impact on 
the Middle East, Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 188-203. 
GUNTER, Michael M. (1993) A de facto Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 295-319. 
——— (Spring 1996) The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq, Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 224-241. 
82 
 
——— (Summer 1988) The Kurdish Problem in Turkey, Middle East Journal, Vol. 
42, No. 3, pp. 389-406. 
——— (Oct. 2000) The Continuing Kurdish Problem in Turkey after Öcalan‟s 
Capture, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 5, pp. 849-869. 
——— (Winter 2005) The U.S.-Turkish Alliance in Disarray, World Affairs, Vol. 
167, No. 3, pp. 113-123. 
HALE, William (Oct. 1992) Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis, 
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944 –), Vol. 68, No. 4, 
pp. 679-692. 
HASSANPOUR, Amir (July-August 1994) The Kurdish Experience, Middle East 
Report, No. 189, The Kurdish Experience, pp. 2-7 + 23. 
HIRSCHLER, Konrad (July 2001) Defining the Nation: Kurdish Historiography in 
Turkey in the 1990s, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 145-166. 
KADIOĞLU, AyĢe (April 1996) The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the 
Construction of Official Identity, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 177-
193. 
KIBAROGLU, Mustafa (Spring 2005) Clash of Interest over Northern Iraq Drives 
Turkish-Israeli Alliance to a Crossroads, Middle East Journal, Vol. 59, No. 2, 
Changing Geopolitics, pp. 246-264. 
KIRISCI, Kemal (July 2000) Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration 
Practices, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 1-22. 
——— (March 2004) Between Europe and the Middle East: The Transformation of 
Turkish Policy, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 39-
51. 
KOC, Ismet and ONAN, Isil (Spring 2004) International Migrants‟ Remittances and 
Welfare Status of the Left-Behind Families in Turkey, International Migration 
Review, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 78-112. 
83 
 
KUBICEK, Paul (Fall 2005) Turkish Accession to the European Union: Challenges 
and Opportunities, World Affairs, Vol. 168, No. 2, pp. 67 - 78. 
KUTSCHERA, Chris (Winter 2002) The Kurds Secret Scenarios, Middle East 
Report, No. 225, pp. 14-21. 
LAWSON, Fred H. (Winter 2007) Syria‟s Relations with Iran: Managing the 
Dilemmas of Alliance, Middle East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 29-47. 
MARDIN, ġerif (Winter 1973) Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish 
Politics?, Daedalus, Vol. 102, No. 1, Post-Traditional Societies, 169-190. 
MCDOWALL, David (April 1999) Own Goal for Turkey?, The World Today, Vol. 
55, No. 4, pp. 8-10. 
MUFTI, Malik (Winter 1998) Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy, 
Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 32-50. 
MURINSON, Alexander (November 2006) The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish 
Foreign Policy, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 6, pp. 945-964.  
NAAMANI, Israel T. (Summer 1966) The Kurdish Drive for Self-Determination, 
Middle East Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 279-295. 
OGUZLU, H. Tarik (Winter 2005/2006) The Changing Turkish Approach Towards 
the European Union after 9/11, International Journal, Vol. 61, No. 1, Turkey: Myths 
and Realities, pp. 83-104. 
OLSON, Robert (1992) The Kurdish question in the Aftermath of the Gulf War: 
Geopolitical and Geostrategic Changes in the Middle East, Third World Quarterly, 
Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 475-499.  
——— (Oct. 2000) Turkey-Iran Relations, 1997 to 2000: The Kurdish and Islamist 
Questions, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 5, pp. 871-890. 
PAPE, Robert A. (Summer 2005) Soft Balancing against the United States, 
International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 7-45. 
84 
 
PATTON, Marcie J. (Summer 2003) Voices from Turkey‟s Southeast, Middle East 
Report, No. 227, pp. 42-45. 
ROBINS, Philip (Oct. 1993) The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish 
Issue, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944 –), Vol. 69, 
No. 4, pp. 657-676. 
——— (May 2003) Confusion at Home, Confusion Abroad: Turkey between 
Copenhagen and Iraq, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 
1944 –), Vol. 79, No. 3, pp. 547-566. 
——— (Nov. 2006) The 2005 BRISMES Lecture: A Double Gravity State: Turkish 
Foreign Policy Reconsidered, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 33, 
No. 2, pp. 199-211. 
ROOSEVELT, Archie Jr. (July 1947) The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, Middle 
East Journal, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 247-269. 
SAKALLIOGLU, Ümit Cizre (Jan. 1997) The Anatomy of the Turkish Military‟s 
Political Autonomy, Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 151-166. 
——— (Spring 2003) Demythologyzing the National Security Concept: The Case of 
Turkey, Middle East Journal, Vol. 57, No. 2, pp. 213-229. 
SAYARI, Sabri (Spring 1997) Turkey and the Middle East in 1990s, Journal of 
Palestine Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 44-55. 
SOMER, Murat (Spring 2004) Turkey‟s Kurdish Conflict: Changing Context, and 
Domestic and Regional Implications, Middle East Journal, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 235-
253. 
TEITELBAUM, Michael S. and MARTIN, Philip L. (May-June 2003) Is Turkey 
Ready for Europe?, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 3, pp. 97-111. 
WATTS, Nicole F. (Nov. 1999) Allies and Enemies: Pro-Kurdish Parties in Turkish 
Politics 1990-94, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 
631-656. 
85 
 
News Articles 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Europaeischer Gerichtshof: Öcalan-Prozess in der 
Türkei war unfair [European Court: Öcalan-Process in Turkey was unfair], May 12, 
2005. 
Hürriyet Daily News, With an eye on their Iraqi brothers, Syria‟s Kurds speak out 
about their suffering and hopes, November 2, 2002. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Syria to try party leaders over Kurdish protest, February 11, 
2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Öcalan ruling sparks fresh dispute with Europe, March 13, 
2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, HADEP closed, DEHAP in row, March 14, 2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Iraqi Kurds vow to return to oil hub if war begins, March 14, 
2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Closure of pro-Kurdish party draws international reaction, 
March 15, 2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, In bitter exchange of fire with EU, Turkey bans pro-Kurdish 
party, March 16, 2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Turkish Press Scanner, March 19, 2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Talabani: My dream is for Iraq and not for Kurdistan, March 
21, 2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Turcomans: Khalilzad setting conditions for advisory 
committee inclusion, March 21, 2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Turcomans seeking a US type provincial structure in Iraq, 
April 8, 2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, WP: Gen. Ozkok faces tough choice in Iraq, April 10, 2003.  
Hürriyet Daily News, Turkey‟s unease held in check by US, April 11, 2003. 
86 
 
Hürriyet Daily News, ITC calls for U.S.-Turkish committee to investigate Kirkuk 
events, April 12, 2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Gul demands swift order in Iraq as US calm N. Iraq cities, 
April 14, 2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Barzani urges US to establish Iraqi rule soon, April 15, 2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Ankara concerned that Iraqi Kurds are acting too independent 
minded, April 20, 2003.  
Hürriyet Daily News, Arabs in Kirkuk say forced to leave homes by Kurds, April 23, 
2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Turkey conveys uneasiness on Garner‟s remarks to US, April 
25, 2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Saleh visits Turkey to discuss latest developments, April 29, 
2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Barzani hails election, says Kurds freed from fear, May 31, 
2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Iraqi Kurds seek reversal of “ethnic cleansing”, July 1, 2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, US move to detain Turkish soldiers in N. Iraq draws ire in 
Ankara as relations face new crisis, July 7, 2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Kurds want to see Kirkuk as capital city of „Kurdistan‟, July 
31, 2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Turkmens seek US to end Kurdish domination in Kirkuk, 
September 21, 2003.  
Hürriyet Daily News, The DEHAP closure syndrome, September 25, 2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Official support extended to Kurdish language center, October 
23, 2003. 
87 
 
Hürriyet Daily News, Kurdish language courses on hold in Turkey despite EU 
reforms, November 7, 2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Syrian cooperation hailed, December 3, 2003. 
Hürriyet Daily News, New perspectives in ties, January 5, 2004. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Syrian president starts historic visit today, January 6, 2004. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Turkish Press Scanner, January 9, 2004. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Assad‟s visit buries old enmity, opens new era, January 11, 
2004. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Iran reassures Turkey on border security, January 12, 2004. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Court rejects releasing ex-MP‟s 11th time, February 21, 2004.  
Hürriyet Daily News, Kurdish riots in Syria die down after stern warnings, March 
15, 2004. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Life easing back to normal in north Syria, March 16, 2004. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Kurds battle Syrian police, March 18, 2004. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Tension in Syria rages on, March 19, 2004.  
Hürriyet Daily News, Kurdish unrest stirs old regional fears, March 21, 2004. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Kurdish leader: „Mistakes should not be corrected by 
mistakes‟, March 22, 2004. 
Hürriyet Daily News, TRT begins airing Kurdish broadcasts, June 10, 2004. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Human Rights Watch: Turkey entering new era, June 11, 2004.  
Hürriyet Daily News, Turkey: No fait accompli in Kirkuk, June 22, 2004. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Talabani assures Ankara on Kirkuk, June 24, 2004. 
88 
 
Hürriyet Daily News, Talabani says Iraq‟s Kurds not after independence, July 2, 
2004. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Barzani: „Kirkuk belongs to Kurds‟, July 6, 2004. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Turkish Press Scanner, July 9, 2004   
Hürriyet Daily News, Turkish Press Scanner, July 10, 2004.  
Hürriyet Daily News, Turkey pleas with neighbors on Kirkuk, July 23, 2004.  
Hürriyet Daily News, Demirel: „We failed to explain the Kurdish problem‟, July 27, 
2004. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Kurdish leaders in Ankara, September 8, 2004. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Shorts Diplomacy II, December 28, 2004. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Turkey won‟t sit back over Kirkuk spillover, January 28, 2005. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Zebari says Turkey‟s poll worries misplaced, February 15, 
2005. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Human Rights report criticizes Turkey over not doing enough 
for 1000s of displaced, March 9, 2005. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Nevroz celebrated with enthusiasm in Diyarbakır, March 22, 
2005.  
Hürriyet Daily News, Öcalan anxiety grips Ankara, May 12, 2005. 
Hürriyet Daily News, ECHR call for Ocalan retrial met grimly by Turkey, May 13, 
2005. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Turkey‟s displaced persons key for its social peace, May 15, 
2005. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Syrian court jails three Kurds for separatism, May 23, 2005. 
89 
 
Hürriyet Daily News, Riot erupts in Iranian hotbed of Kurdish nationalism, June 16, 
2005. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Legacy of strife haunts Kurdish villagers in Turkey, July 10, 
2005.  
Hürriyet Daily News, Syria says cooperating with Turkey against PKK, July 21, 
2005. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Diplomacy Newsline, July 26, 2005. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Washington urges Tehran to respect Kurds‟ rights, August 10, 
2005. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Iran vows to continue anti-PKK cooperation with Turkey, 
August 15, 2005. 
Hürriyet Daily News, PKK violence mounts in Iran, Syria, August 17, 2005. 
Hürriyet Daily News, DEHAP Dissolved, joins Zana‟s movement, August 18, 2005. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Syria jails three members of Kurdish party, August 29, 2005. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Iran police kill PKK-linked Kurd in clashes, November 14, 
2005. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Kurdish broadcasts to begin in January, December 29, 2005. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Syrian court jails three Kurds for belonging to PKK, February 
14, 2006. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Iranian police clash with PKK supporters, February 20, 2006. 
Hürriyet Daily News, RTÜK approves Kurdish broadcasts, March 9, 2006. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Diplomacy Newsline, March 31, 2006. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Solution through more democracy, April 5, 2006. 
90 
 
Hürriyet Daily News, Iran arrests seven members of PKK-linked group, April 11, 
2006. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Iran launches missile attack on PKK-linked group in Iraq, 
April 22, 2006  
Hürriyet Daily News, Iran launches second attack on PKK in one week, April 28, 
2006. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Lagendijk speaks tough against Turkey, May 4, 2006. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Court rejects Öcalan‟s retrial, May 6, 2006. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Iran seeks ban on pro-PKK satellite broadcasts, May 12, 
2006. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Limits on Kurdish movies and music lifted, June 13, 2006.  
Hürriyet Daily News, PKK leader Öcalan denied retrial, July 27, 2006.  
Hürriyet Daily News, Report: Turkey, Iran open fire on PKK camps in Iraq, August 
14, 2006. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Iraqi Kurd representation may jeopardize tripartite PKK talks, 
September 13, 2006. 
Hürriyet Daily News, PKK and Iraqi Kurds are „one and the same,‟ Turk military 
believes, November 19, 2006. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Kirkuk „red line‟ for Iraqi Kurds, says Mufti, December 19, 
2006. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Sezer calls Kurds a part of majority, January 11, 2007. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Iraqi Kurdish officials reject Turkish statements on Kirkuk, 
January 30, 2007. 
Hürriyet Daily News, „Fight against PKK unites Turkey, Iran‟, February 5, 2007. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Iran threatens to pursue Pejak inside Iraq, March 1, 2007. 
91 
 
Hürriyet Daily News, US push for Turk-Iraqi Kurd cooperation against PKK going 
nowhere, June 20, 2007. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Iraq forced to pressure PKK, October 18, 2007. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Iraq unable to hand over PKK leaders to Turkey: Talabani, 
October 22, 2007.  
Hürriyet Daily News, „No solution to PKK without Iraqi Kurds‟, October 24, 2007.  
Hürriyet Daily News, Ahmadinejad seeks to improve Iran image with Ankara visit, 
December 11, 2007. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Envoy tells no timetable for troop pullout, February 28, 2008. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Iraqi president to visit Turkey following ground operation, 
March 5, 2008. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Turkish FM signals closer dialogue with Iraqi Kurds, April 29, 
2008. 
Hürriyet Daily News, PACE concerned about DTP closure case, October 6, 2008. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Turkey edges further toward EU, December 20, 2009. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Turks seek more trade with Iraqi Kurds despite tensions, June 
27, 2010. 
Hürriyet Daily News, We are considering Iraq incursion, says minister, September 
13, 2011.  
Hürriyet Daily News, Assad to play Kurdish card against Turkey, report says, 
November 9, 2011. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Ankara gives double-barrel anti-PKK fight, November 14, 
2011. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Syria regime „using‟ PKK, dissident says, January 26, 2012.  
92 
 
Radikal, Anayasa Mahkemesi DTP‟yi oybirliğiyle kapattı [Constitutional Court voted 
unanimously to close down the DTP], December 12, 2009. 
The New York Times, Kurds Are Finally Heard: Turkey Burned Our Villages, 
October 24, 2003. 
The New York Times, World Briefing/Middle East: Syrian President in First Visit 
To Turkey, January 7, 2004. 
The New York Times, Kurdish Unrest Spreads in Syria; Up to 15 Dead, Scores 
Wounded, March 14, 2004. 
The New York Times, Turks Free 4 Kurds Whose Jailing Irked European Union, 
June 10, 2004. 
The New York Times, Bush Hails Iraq Vote as „a Resounding Success‟, January 30, 
2005. 
The New York Times, The Coming Clash Over Kirkuk, February 9, 2005. 
The New York Times, European Court Urges Turkey to Grant Kurdish Leader a 
New Trial, May 13, 2005 
The New York Times, Unrest in Iran‟s Kurdish Region Has Left 17 Dead; Hundreds 
Have Been Wounded, August 14, 2005. 
The New York Times, Kurds are Flocking to Kirkuk, Laying Claim to Land and Oil, 
December 29, 2005. 
The New York Times, U.S. Will Help Turks Stop Kurdish Inroads From Iraq, April 
25, 2006. 
The New York Times, Can They All Get Along in Iraq? The Report Says They Have 
To, December 8, 2006. 
The New York Times, Turkey and Iran Unite to Attack Kurdish Rebels, June 6, 
2008. 
The New York Times, Turkey Bans Kurdish Party, December 11, 2009. 
Zaman, DTP‟li başkan: PKK ile duygusal bağımız var [A principle of the DTP: We 
have emotional relationship with the PKK], April 17, 2007. 
Websites 
European Union: http://europa.eu/index_en.htm 
93 
 
European Union Ministry of Turkey: http://www.abgs.gov.tr/ 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: http://www.faz.net/ 
Hürriyet Daily News: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ 
Radikal Newspaper: www.radikal.com.tr 
The New York Times: www.nytimes.com 
Turkish Foreign Ministry: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/default.tr.mfa 
Zaman Newspaper: www.zaman.com.tr 
